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INTRODUCTION
The seemingly inexorable. march toward a more unified political and
economic world order poses strategic and leadership challenges to
States, international organizations, and local activists unimaginable a
generation ago.' Governed by an increasingly interdependent world
* Jeffery M. Brown, B.A., Philosophy Davidson College; J.D., The University of
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particular I wish to thank my research assistants, Michael Myzia and Yan Teitleman, for their
hard work and dedication. I also wish to thank Professors Kevin Hopkins, Steve Kropp, Larry
Schlam, and Spencer Waller, whose insights proved especially helpful. Of course, I attribute
none of the missteps herein to any of my readers. Finally, I extend my thanks to Northern
Illinois University College of Law for a generous summer research stipend.
I. See generally Peter Malanczuk, Globalization and the Future Role of Sovereign
States, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 45, 49-53 (Friedl Weiss et
al. eds., 1998) (noting the challenges that the international community faces as a result of the
emerging global economic order). See also Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical
Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001) (tracing the rise of the law
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economy, 2 the liberalization of international economic regulatory restric-
tions, and the enactment of legal norms favoring the mobility of
international investor capital and labor,3 this emerging and increasingly
complex system elicits both approbation and despair. Supporters of this
process, commonly called economic globalization, argue that easing in-
ternational economic regulatory restrictions, creating a more predictable
legal order, and liberalizing investment standards will benefit the global
economy by rendering financial transactions more efficient, thereby in-
creasing trade and investment opportunities.4
More euphemistically, commentators who advocate the expansion of
free trade argue that such expansion will benefit all participating nations,
both developed and developing, by rendering hitherto closed economies
open to greater investment and development Greater investment and
development in turn will raise living standards, especially in developing
countries, through the creation of new jobs and greater opportunities for
economic advancement.6 In light of the opportunities suggested by
economic globalization, many international trade scholars advocate
strengthening the emerging system by further reducing those barriers that
have historically hampered the creation of a truly global free trade regime.'
By the same token, globalization poses important conceptual chal-
lenges to international law and international trade scholars committed to
and organizing movement which stresses the primacy of local initiatives to empower histori-
cally marginalized communities).
2. See Louis W. Pauly, Capital Mobility, State Autonomy and Political Legitimacy, 48 J.
INT'L AFF. 369, 369 (1995) (noting that "[t]he 'globalization of finance' is the latest jargon
used to connote a number of interrelated developments in the contemporary world economy.
Among the most important changes are the reduction of direct controls and taxes on capital
movements, the liberalization of long-standing regulatory restrictions within financial markets,
the expansion of lightly regulated off-shore financial markets and the introduction of new
technologies in the process of capital intermediation. These developments render capital more
mobile, both within and across national borders.").
3. See, e.g., G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An
Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 837 (1995) (observing that ad-
vocates of the so-called Efficient Market Model of international trade "see binding
international trade rules as instruments with which to achieve efficient international capital
and consumer markets by eliminating needless government interference and intrusion in inter-
national trade").
4. See, e.g., Michael D. Pendleton, A New Human Right-The Right to Globalization, 22
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2052 (1999).
5. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic
Law: Reflections on the "Boilerroom" of International Relations, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 595, 603 (1995) (observing that current trade liberalization policies are designed to
promote enhancement of world welfare, but also noting that these policies sometimes conflict
with other policy goals).
6. See Shell, supra note 3, at 834-35, 854-55 (noting that free trade has accounted for
much of the world's economic prosperity since the end of World War 11, at least according to
the free trade proponents). Shell refers to these adherents as "free trade legalists." Id.
7. See Shell, supra note 3, at 854-55.
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defending local interests and historically marginalized people against the
perceived adverse effects of accelerated global economic expansion.
Some of these perceived adverse effects include the loss of middle-class
manufacturing jobs, the erosion of environmental and labor standards in
developing countries, and an acceleration of the so-called "rush to the
bottom phenomenon."9 A growing number of critics have argued that this
expansion has actually weakened local communities because the current
economic order gives primacy to the demands of foreign investor capital
over the economic and political viability of local interests and institu-
tions.'0 Therefore it is not surprising that ensuring the continued
economic and political viability of historically marginalized groups, es-
pecially ethnic and racial minorities like African-Americans, has become
a central preoccupation of scholars who remain openly critical of" or
cautiously optimistic about' 2 economic globalization.
8. See Ibrahim J. Gassama, Transnational Critical Race Scholarship: Transcending
Ethnic and National Chauvinism in the Era of Globalization, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 133
(1999) (acknowledging the need to incorporate a broader global perspective into social justice
discussions); Gil Gott, Critical Race Globalism?: Global Political Economy and the Intersec-
tions of Race, Nation, and Class, 33 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1503 (2000) (arguing in favor of a
synthesis of critical race theory and international racial justice concerns as a response to the
neoliberal discourse of economic globalization).
9. See Gassama, supra note 8, at 157 (criticizing the free trade regime created by the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO)
for encouraging "a seemingly never-ending global race to the bottom"). The "rush" occurs
when States compete for foreign investments by loosening domestic regulatory standards,
thereby making the investment climate in their country more attractive. See also Jose Alvarez,
Critical Race Theory and the North American Free Trade Agreement's Chapter Eleven, 28 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 303 (1997) (arguing that free trade regimes like the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which stress their purported "scrupulous neutrality and
equal protection" orientation, serve only to formalize the existing economic inequalities be-
tween the developed and developing worlds).
10. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Rethinking International Trade, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON.
L. 347, 386-89 (1998) (noting that modern international trade dispute mechanisms like the
WTO Appellate Body appear ill-equipped to reconcile conflicts that implicate both trade-
related and non-trade values like labor and environmental concerns, primarily because the
system was not designed to achieve such reconciliation).
11. See Gott, supra note 8, at 1504 (proposing a synthesis of critical race and interna-
tional justice concerns as a response to globalization's tendency to marginalize historically
subordinated communities). Gott has employed the phrase "critical race globalism" to denote
scholarly efforts to link international law, racial justice, and critical race theory problematics
into a distinct analytical modality. Id.; see also Gassama, supra note 8, at 158 (urging critical
race scholars to embrace a transnational or global perspective in order to energize the ideo-
logically moribund civil rights discourse that underscores most domestic and even global
discussions on social and racial justice); Anthony D. Taibi, Racial Justice in the Age of the
Global Economy: Community Empowerment and Global Strategy, 44 DUKE L.J. 928, 977
(1995) (promoting community-based institutional development as a way to empower the black
community).
12. See generally Enrique R. Carrasco, Opposition, Justice, Structuralism, and Particu-
larity: Intersections Between LatCrit Theory and Law and Development Studies, 28 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 313, 314-17, 327-36 (1997) (arguing in favor of an analytical model that
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Given the complexities of the global economic order, determining
precisely what strategies might best ensure the viability of historically
marginalized people has proven challenging. Some commentators have
proposed a merger of critical race and global justice perspectives as a
way to counter globalization's most disruptive social and economic im-
pacts." Still others argue that economic globalization remains a viable
option so long as that system does not disregard the needs of marginal-
ized groups.'4 This general preoccupation with global racial justice
notwithstanding, what these various perspectives also suggest is a deep
uncertainty, and perhaps an even deeper ambivalence, regarding the ul-
timate implications of economic globalization. Such uncertainty seems
inevitable given the multifaceted dimensions of globalization' 5 and the
degree to which talk of its expansion tends to galvanize world opinion,
both for and against it. Indeed, I argue that the complexities and uncer-
tainties of the emerging global economy suggest the need to approach
problems of race, class, and international law from a more flexible ideo-
logical perspective, one that eschews unproductive categorical
generalities in favor of a more nuanced interpretative methodology. Such
a methodology would neither embrace nor reject economic globalization
out of hand but would simply recognize this phenomenon as an unavoid-
able feature of postindustrial life. Moreover, a more nuanced
interpretative methodology would attempt to respond to the particular
legal, economic, and political imperatives of globalization pragmatically,
not symbolically.
This is not to suggest that economic globalization has not histori-
cally engendered and reinforced the subordination and exploitation of
racial and ethnic minorities.' 6 To some it clearly has. In this light, efforts
remains constructively critical of neoliberalism, but which does not propose radical systemic
change to the prevailing model of socioeconomic organization). Neoliberalism in this context
refers to the belief that regulation of the global economy is best left to market forces and that
government regulation should be minimized).
13. See Gott, supra note 8, at 1504.
14. See Carrasco, supra note 12.
15. See generally Friedl Weiss & Paul De Waart, International Economic Law with a
Human Face: An Introductory View, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE
2 (Friedl Weiss et al. eds., 1998) (noting that the "ongoing integration of the world economy,
popularly described as 'globalization,' constitutes a comprehensive challenge to established
principles of ordering life in economically and legally distinct territorial fragments"). The
authors further note that "[wihile some societies will be able to share some of the benefits of
economic growth and welfare resulting from globalization, others remain excluded and in-
creasingly marginalized." Id.
16. See generally MELVIN M. LEIMAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACISM: A HISTORY
(1993) (tracing the genesis of Western racial prejudice and discrimination, an inevitable by-
product of the global slave trade, to the development and expansion of global capitalism be-
ginning in the seventeenth century, and continuing into the present under the guise of
economic globalization). Importantly, Leiman's invective against the inherent racial biases of
[Vol. 23:807
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to expose, via critical narrative and analysis, the lingering impacts of
economic and political racial subordination that globalization purport-
edly reinforces serve an important historical and expositive function.17
Nevertheless, exposing precisely how economic globalization has im-
peded black progress and reinforced historic patterns of subordination
and discrimination does not, in and of itself, indicate what the black
community should actually do in response.
For the black community then, the more pressing challenge concerns
how best to employ and perhaps realign existing empowerment strategies
to address the most fundamental aspects of globalization, its economic
and supporting legal dimensions." This emphasis on global economic
considerations appears all the more pertinent given the precarious eco-
nomic status of the poorest African-Americans in the postindustrial era.
Black unemployment levels for August 2002 hovered at around 9.6 per-
cent compared with 5.1 percent for white workers. 9 While the number of
black-owned businesses actually increased drastically between 1992 and
1997,20 suggesting greater black economic participation in the national
economy, statistical evidence also indicates that minority-owned busi-
nesses in general were not a significant source of employment, except
for their proprietors.' While black unemployment figures have dropped
significantly from the 14 to 15 percent levels seen in the early 1990s, the
Western capitalism reflects an understanding that economic globalization is not a phenomenon
exclusive to the twentieth century, but is merely the latest incarnation of a systemic transna-
tional pattern of economic expansion that has progressed historically in discreet stages.
17. See, e.g., Hope Lewis, Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights of
Inter/National Black Women in the United States, 76 OR. L. REV. 567 (1997) (discussing how
feminist human rights scholarship can offer insights into the history of traditionally
marginalized groups in the United States, especially women of color).
18. See Michael H. Davis & Dana Neacsu, Legitimacy, Globally: The Incoherence of
Free Trade Practice, Global Economics and Their Governing Principles of Political Economy,
69 UMKC L. REV. 733 (2001) (defining globalization as both a legal and an economic phe-
nomenon).
19. Press Release, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment
and Unemployment, National Employment, Economic News Releases: Employment Situation
Summary (Sept. 6, 2002), at http://www.bls.gov/ces/home.htm [hereinafter Employment
Situation Summary].
20. Press Release, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, Minority Owned
Firms Grow Four Times Faster Than National Average, Census Bureau Reports (July 12,
2001), at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2001/cbOI - 115.html (more recent fig-
ures are not yet available).
21. Press Release, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, More Than
800,000 U.S. Businesses Owned by African Americans; New York, California, Texas Lead
States, Census Bureau Reports (Mar. 22, 2001) (noting that only one in five minority-owned
businesses actually employed workers other than their owners), at http://www.census.gov/
Press-Release/www/2001/cb0l-54.html.
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most recent federal government indicators suggest that black unem-
ployment is again on the rise."
When one considers the relatively limited economic progress that the
poorest African-Americans have made over the past three decades com-
pared to the progress of the black middle class, available statistics paint
an equally troubling picture. Thus, while the wealthiest blacks appear to
have made significant economic gains over the last three decades, the
poorest blacks have, in proportional terms, lost ground to the black mid-
dle class when compared to their counterparts from earlier periods.23
While hardly conclusive, these figures suggest the continuation of a
decades-old trend in the African-American community: incremental if
hardly revolutionary black middle-class economic progress coupled with
the ongoing socioeconomic stagnation of the poorest African-Americans.
Perhaps most telling is the general understanding that the endemic
poverty and entrenched social pathologies that afflict urban black centers
around the country show few if any signs of improving, despite the
promises of better living standards for all in the era of globalization and
free trade.24 Moreover, the complexities of economic globalization, and
the increasingly interrelated way in which national economies now oper-
ate suggest that the task of addressing the seemingly intractable problem
of black urban poverty may prove more difficult than anyone ever imag-
ined.
22. See Employment Situation Summary, supra note 19. Additionally, black
unemployment figures have shown a marked increase over the past year, possibly raising
questions about the ability of the most recent economic expansionary period to reduce in the
long term historically high levels of black unemployment, levels that typically hover at about
twice the level of white unemployment. See also Max Smith, William Spriggs on the Hidden
Message of Black Unemployment, AFRICANA.cOM, at http://www.africana.com/DailyArticles/
index_20011115_2.htm (Nov. 15, 2001) (noting that black unemployment trends traditionally
exceed white levels, typically by a factor of two). Smith also suggests that black
unemployment rates can be expected to rise faster than the national average, indicating a
greater susceptibility on the part of the black community to the vicissitudes of the job market.
Id.
23. Press Release, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Census Bureau, People, Income,
Historical Income Tables, People, Table H-3b, Mean Income Received by Each Fifth and Top
5 Percent of Black Households: 1967-2000 (Aug. 22, 2002), at http:/www.census.gov/hhes/
income/histinc/h03b.html.
24. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987). Professor Wilson's book offers perhaps the most
trenchant discussion of the calcification of urban black poverty, debilitating social pathologies
and the policies that perpetuate these conditions. Wilson argues that a failure to grapple with
these problems will result in the continued marginalization of these blacks from the nation's
social, political, and economic mainstream. See also RANDALL ROBINSON, THE RECKONING:
WHAT BLACKS OWE TO EACH OTHER (2002) (calling on black Americans of all classes to join
the struggle to eliminate the persistent socioeconomic pathologies that have destroyed inner-
city black America). Robinson's appeal suggests that the problems identified by Wilson fifteen
years ago persist. Id.
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Not surprisingly, recent attempts to outline black economic empow-
erment strategies invariably stress the need to do so within the
framework of the existing political-economic order.25 These proposals
also suggest that many commentators continue to view possible solutions
to the endemic problem of urban black poverty as dependent on domes-
tic initiatives exclusively. Certainly, any collective black response to the
perceived inequities engendered by the extant political-economic order
must first reflect the prevailing sensibilities and expectations of those
selfsame black Americans, and must also remain grounded in the prag-
matic realities of black life in the twenty-first century.26 I would add,
however, that a truly effective strategy of black economic empowerment
must also address the unique realities of the global economy. Thus, in
addition to more traditional domestic concerns such as employment and
credit discrimination, black America must also contend with the problem
of overseas job migrations stemming from corporate decisions to invest
globally but not locally. In short, black America must not only craft
strategies responsive to domestic economic challenges, but must also
reassess the manner in which it responds to the realities of an increas-
ingly interconnected and complex global landscape.
Problematically, traditional modalities of black engagement in world
affairs, or black internationalism, have typically not linked the generally
precarious economic status of black Americans to larger global devel-
opments. 27 Instead, black internationalism has typically stressed the
degree to which African-American liberation and empowerment strug-
gles and those of the African diaspora around the globe are interrelated.
25. See, e.g., Lateef Mtima, African-American Economic Empowerment Strategies for the
New Millennium-Revisiting the Washington-Du Bois Dialectic, 42 How. L.J. 391, 418-19
(1999) (positing that African-American economic empowerment strategies might be better
directed toward providing white employers with "new incentives to abandon the discrimina-
tory choices or practices that result from these racially reflexive feelings.... The objective
should be to reduce or eliminate the discriminatory impacts of these feelings [of racial preju-
dice against black workers]"); see also David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Revisited: Antimarkets,
Consumption, and Empowerment, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2000) (recognizing the consumption
of goods and services as a central feature of our economic system, and suggesting that con-
sumer protection laws might be revised to mitigate the debilitating effects of conspicuous and
irrational inner-city consumption practices).
26. See Carrasco, supra note 12 (suggesting that critical discourse of the existing eco-
nomic system must remain cognizant of the realities of that system); see also HAROLD CRUSE,
PLURAL BUT EQUAL (William Marrow ed., 1987) (arguing more generally that an effective
policy of black economic empowerment must respond to and remain compatible with the
existing economic order).
27. There are, of course, exceptions to this observation, but they are rare. For example,
Marcus Garvey's explicitly economic conception of black internationalism held that the
shared economic interests of African-Americans and the African diaspora in other parts of the
world, especially the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa, could serve as the basis for a global
black trading network. Because of its working-class appeal, I discuss the Garvey movement in
greater detail in Section II.C infra.
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This philosophy of Pan-African solidarity rests on the basic assumption
that people of color throughout the world, but especially those of African
origins, share a common history of racial oppression and subjugation.28
More specifically, Pan-Africanism, at least from the African-
American perspective, views the distinct cultural links between African-
Americans and other members of the African diaspora as forming the
basis for mutually beneficial cooperative action. In describing his vision
of an African continent liberated from the yoke of colonial oppression,
W.E.B. Du Bois noted, "[t]he Negroes in the United States... could eas-
ily furnish from time to time technical experts, leaders of thought, and
missionaries of culture for their backward brethren in the new Africa."29
Thus, for Du Bois, Pan-Africanism encompassed a belief in a global cul-
tural pluralism that stressed the convergence of African-American and
other African diaspora interests in the face of racial oppression and sub-
jugation. However, in describing the underlying tenets upon which a
more narrowly articulated and distinctly African conception of Pan-
Africanism was based, P. Mweti Munya has more recently stressed the
"eradication of colonialism and the promotion of African nationalism" as
primary goals.3° More importantly, Munya emphasizes that this
re-articulated formulation of Pan-Africanism has largely jettisoned its
earlier sentimentalized platform of racial solidarity in favor of a platform
that placed bread-and-butter African, that is, not African-American, anti-
colonial problematics at the forefront.'
This admittedly brief survey of Pan-Africanism is offered to
demonstrate that the prevailing Pan-African trajectory of black
(African-American) internationalism, expressed most recently in the
Free South Africa Movement and in black opposition to the Bananas
trade war, remains wed to a long-outdated and "sentimentalized platform
of racial solidarity."32 Unlike the re-articulated, interest-based Pan-
Africanism described by Munya, black internationalism continues to
champion a romanticized vision of Pan-African solidarity, a vision
grounded not in pragmatic political and economic considerations, but
28. See JOHN K. MARAH, AFRICAN PEOPLE IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: AN INTRODUCTION
TO PAN AFRICAN STUDIES 79, 79-116 (1998).
29. W.E.B. Du Bois, The Hands of Ethiopia, in Du Bois: WRITINGS 939, 948 (Nathan
Irvin Huggins ed., 1986). Later in his career, Du Bois himself would embrace a platform of
global Pan-African economic cooperation as a necessary component in black America's strug-
gle for racial equality, though his earlier hostility to such an approach rendered his later
conversion largely unacceptable to his followers.
30. P. Mweti Munya, The Organization of African Unity and Its Role in Regional Conflict
Resolution and Dispute Settlement: A Critical Evaluation, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 537,
540-41 (1999).
31. Id. at 540-41.
32. Id. at 540.
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instead grounded in the prevailing mythos of convergent African-
American and African, or Caribbean, interests. This has rendered black
internationalism in its current iteration unable to address the profound
and complex challenges of economic globalization, and unable to assist
in fulfilling the very real material expectations of the poorest African-
Americans.
In light of these realities, this Article proposes a paradigm shift away
from the traditional rights-based, Pan-Africanist trajectory of black
internationalism, grounded largely in concerns over racial justice and
Pan-African solidarity,33 and instead embraces an economically grounded
black empowerment strategy that is responsive first and foremost to the
unique economic imperatives of the emerging world economy.34 Indeed,
the growing complexity of the emerging global economic order as repre-
sented by a shift toward rule formalism in the, international trade sphere
and embodied in multilateral initiatives like the North American Free
Trade Agreement,35 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,36 and
the World Trade Organization,37 mandates that black institutions reassess
traditional empowerment strategies that have little chance of succeeding
in this fluid environment.3 8 In the absence of such a fundamental ideo-
logical and programmatic reassessment, black internationalism will
never realize its inherent potential to serve as an effective platform for
black economic, political, and institutional empowerment. Indeed, a
critical assessment of black internationalism is both essential and long
overdue.
This suggests that black internationalism approach the problems of
racial subordination and exploitation that globalization reinforces by
identifying core substantive black interests impacted by that system, and
33. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border: The Interdependence of Foreign Policy
and Racial Justice in the United States, 1 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 53 (1998) (defining
racial justice as a process linking domestic racial subordination problematics-especially
those stemming from racially discriminatory U.S. foreign policy initiatives like support for the
South African apartheid regime-to the larger imperatives of international human rights law).
34. A more detailed discussion of the underlying dimensions of traditional liberal
internationalism, black internationalism, and the globalization phenomenon appear in Part I
infra35. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32 I.L.M.
605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT.
37. The World Trade Organization is actually part of a larger body of international trade
reforms that grew out of the Uruguay trade negotiation sessions in 1994. Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 14, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 [hereinafter
WTO Agreement].
38. See Taibi, supra note 11, at 931 (suggesting that black empowerment strategies to ad-
dress problems like lending and housing discrimination must eschew traditional civil rights
paradigms because they can no longer respond effectively to the economic imperatives of
globalization).
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proposing strategies designed to protect and promote those interests.
Such a reassessment should seek to illuminate the unique legal and eco-
nomic dimensions of globalization and propose strategies responsive
thereto. An underlying goal imperative to such an approach would be to
expose the conceptual barriers that have historically impeded adoption of
an economically driven black internationalism, and to suggest a possible
way beyond this impasse. Implicit in this approach is the understanding
that African-American interests may, from time to time, diverge from the
political and economic interests of other people of African descent. For
example, African-American opposition to the African Growth and Op-
portunity Act (AGOA) is premised largely on the fear of the economic
dislocations that would result from a shift in corporate investment priori-
ties away from the major American urban industrial centers and toward
the States of sub-Saharan Africa. This suggests that Africans and Afri-
can-Americans be prepared to identify not only those areas wherein
shared interests exist, but also instances where their respective interests
diverge.39
In more theoretical terms, an economically grounded black interna-
tionalism would, at a minimum, stress three core objectives: (1) overt
economic empowerment; (2) greater black influence in shaping domestic
foreign policy initiatives on matters like free trade and third world devel-
opment; and lastly (3) black institutional capacity building, by which the
goals identified under (1) and (2) above might be more effectively pur-
sued. More pragmatically, such black internationalism would actually
invigorate more traditional efforts to ensure racial justice, both domesti-
cally and globally, by creating a more influential economic and
institutional platform from which to promote and defend black interests.
Because a rights-based model fails to address the larger economic
imperatives of globalization, it cannot readily outline effective strategies
responsive to global economic problematics. When viewed in this light,
one could argue that although the more traditional rights-based approach
to questions of international justice can effectively expose a limited
range of rights-based problematics, this approach has proven less effec-
tive in identifying and resolving the underlying economic tensions often
associated with globalization.
Part I of this Article assesses the core conceptual implications of
globalization for the black community. It identifies the underlying legal
and economic imperatives of globalization and suggests first and fore-
39. See MANNING MARABLE, Free South Africa Movement: Black America's Protest
Connections with South Africa, in SPEAKING TRUTH TO POWER: ESSAYS ON RACE, RESIS-
TANCE, AND RADICALISM 189, 192-95 (1996) (citing the migration of black American jobs to
South Africa as an underlying economic concern that largely escaped the attention of human
rights activists during the Free South Africa Movement).
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most that black internationalism must respond to these particular impera-
tives. By extension, considerable attention is devoted to defining
internationalism generally, black internationalism more specifically, and
discussing how these concepts relate conceptually to globalization. The
traditional liberal formulation of internationalism stresses the desirability
40of creating a global world order governed by predictable legal norms,
referred to herein as "internationalism's primary formulation."
An evaluation of the historic expressions of black internationalism
reveals a corresponding desire on the part of the black community to
maintain the inviolability of international law through the defense of in-
dividual and collective rights, especially those of racial and ethnic
minorities, under the international legal system.4 ' By the same token,
recent scholarship indicates a secondary definition of liberal internation-
alism. According to this secondary formulation, internationalism also
refers to the manner in which states and international actors pursue their
own unique economic, geopolitical, and strategic interests in the global
arena. 42 Applying this definitional framework to black internationalism, I
argue that the latter has remained largely oblivious to the informal im-
peratives of this secondary formulation of internationalism, meaning
those imperatives stressing the pursuit of national, group, or individual
economic, political, and social interests within the larger skein of exist-
ing and emerging international legal norms.
To understand the implications of this bias and the ideological ten-
sions that have ensued, one must understand precisely how black
40. See, e.g., J. M. Spectar, Elephants, Donkeys, or Other Creatures? Presidential Elec-
tion Cycles & International Law of Global Commons, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 975 (2000).
41. See Henry J. Richardson III, The Gulf Crisis and African-American Interests Under
International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 42, 57-68 (1993) (citing the black community's desire
to promote the stature of the United Nations as an objective and evenhanded enforcer of legal
norms as they relate to human rights and use of force questions). This is not to suggest that
black internationalism and black internationalists have sought to maintain the inviolability of
international law through the defense of individual and collective rights, especially those of
racial and ethnic minorities, under the international legal system exclusively. The efforts of the
early Free Africa societies stressed the need for blacks to return to Africa as a way to escape
the perils of chattel slavery. More recently, black internationalists like W.E.B. Du Bois and
Paul Robeson championed black inclusion in a system of global communist cooperation as a
means of achieving racial justice in twentieth-century American society. However, the thrust
of black internationalism throughout much of the second half of the twentieth century has
overwhelmingly involved the pursuit of a relatively narrow set of goals closely aligned to
twentieth-century civil/human rights activism.
42. See generally Spectar, supra note 40 (arguing that the level of sovereign State support
for, and compliance with, international treaties like the Global Commons regime to protect
Antarctica reflects how States like the United States perceive such treaties as promoting na-
tional interests). Confidence in, and compliance with, such treaties appears strongest,
according to Spectar, when the goals of these treaties converge with the particular economic,
security, and geopolitical interests of the United States. By the same token, both confidence
and compliance with such treaties declines when these interests diverge. Id.
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internationalism has responded in practice to particular global chal-
lenges. A programmatic reassessment of this sort must take into account
the historic dimensions of black internationalism, and should propose
strategic alternatives responsive to that particular history. It falls to Part
II to assess the limitations, and ultimately the potentialities, of black in-
ternationalism from an historical perspective. Movements such as the
Free South Africa Movement and the more recent trade dispute between
the United States and the European Union over banana import and ex-
port policies reveal where black internationalism has been. By way of
stark contrast, more overtly economic movements like Marcus Garvey's
Black Star Line initiative, although perceived as a mere footnote on
black internationalism's historical radar screen today, suggests an overtly
economic trajectory along which black internationalism might realign
itself going forward.
It falls to Part III of this Article to define more precisely the contours
of an economically grounded black internationalism. As noted above, an
economics-based formulation must stress three core objectives: (1) overt
economic empowerment; (2) greater black influence in shaping domestic
foreign policy initiatives; and (3) institutional capacity building. No-
where has the need for such a formulation been more apparent than
when concerned black activists and select members of the Congressional
Black Caucus sought to intervene on behalf of Caribbean banana pro-
ducers in a nasty global trade war over European Union banana import
tariff subsidies. Premised largely on the pillars of Pan-African solidarity
and moral right, the intervention of the Congressional Black Caucus and
other concerned activists failed to grasp the deeper global economic and
institutional problematics that confront the black community. The failure
to grasp these imperatives rendered African-American involvement in
that conflict largely ineffective.
Part IV demonstrates how an economically grounded, black interna-
tionalism might impact the trajectory of U.S. foreign trade policy as it
relates to sub-Saharan Africa, although traditional black internationalism
has apparently not yet made this connection. In this Part, the challenges
posed by the recently enacted African Growth and Opportunity Act
(AGOA) will be examined. This Part argues that black internationalism
has failed to address and promote core black economic interests in con-
nection with the mandates of the AGOA, which appear designed to
promote sub-Saharan African political and economic interests over those
of African-Americans by attracting investments away from urban indus-
trial centers in this country in favor of African locales.
At a more conceptual level, this Part argues that an economically
grounded black internationalism must, as a long-term priority, attempt to
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outline an ideological orientation independent of both the majority-
imposed, neoliberal economic ethos as well as the antiglobalization
paradigm. This critical perspective can trace its roots to the radical race
internationalism of writers like W.E.B. Du Bois, who attempted to ex-
pose the structural inadequacies of unrestrained capitalism and to
incorporate this critical perspective into the black institutional main-
stream, but who met with only limited success. 43 This limited success
stems largely from the recognition that black middle-class aversions to
criticism of the capitalist system have rendered black institutions unable
to map strategies that recognize the potentially destabilizing effects of
that system. 4 Part IV suggests a way out of this impasse.
The Article concludes with a set of modest proposals that will hope-
fully engender livelier, more informed debate among international law
and international trade scholars over where black internationalism
should go.
I. BLACK INTERNATIONALISM AND THE
CHALLENGES OF GLOBALIZATION
As a threshold matter, whether efforts to craft empowerment strate-
gies designed to combat the perceived destabilizing effects of economic
globalization prove successful depends in large part on how the propo-
nents of these strategies define the globalization phenomenon. More
pointedly, this requires international law and trade experts, critical race
globalists, 45 and local activists preoccupied with mapping effective re-
sponses to globalization to understand the precise nature of this
amorphous phenomenon and the core challenges suggested thereby. Re-
cent scholarship suggests that international trade and international law
experts often do not give sufficient attention to defining globalization,
43. See W.E.B. Du Bois, Socialism and the Negro Problem, in W.E.B. Du Bois: A
READER 337, 338-40 (Meyer Weinberg ed., 1970) (criticizing prevailing socialist discourse of
the early twentieth century for downplaying the complexities of race and labor in the Ameri-
can context).
44. The question remains whether black intellectuals and activists should criticize the
capitalist system with an eye toward its reform or its demise. See LEIMAN, supra note 16, at
310-15 (arguing that black progress has been limited by the inability of the black bourgeoisie
to mount an effective critique against capitalism, a system Leiman would have us undo). Simi-
larly, one has only to recall the outrage Paul Robeson's conversion to communism engendered
among whites and blacks, to appreciate the degree to which blacks remain wed to the ethos of
Western-style capitalism as a means of empowerment.
45. See Gott, supra note 8, at 1504-05 (defining critical race globalism as an emerging
legal modality linking traditional critical race theory to international racial justice concerns).
Some might refer to this approach as the internationalization of critical race theory. Occasion-
ally, I will use the phrase "critical race globalism" to refer to that branch of legal scholarship
named by and generally consistent with Gott's critical race methodology.
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and therefore have not always grasped its deeper implications . Much of
this confusion owes to a tendency to use the term "globalization" in a
very general, albeit imprecise, fashion.4 ' After all, globalization has en-
tered into the political, legal, and economic lexicons as a catchall term
denoting a wide range of related, interrelated, and even unrelated devel-
opments that have swept the globe during the past two decades. 48
Unfortunately, this tendency to generalize has more often than not led to
a lack of specificity in discussing the perceived adverse effects generally
associated with globalization.
Recent attempts to define globalization have stressed its
quintessential economic and legal dimensions. Michael H. Davis and
Dana Neacsu define globalization as "a political phenomenon whose
strategy is to internationalize capitalism through a process of
legalization. '5 ° This definition of globalization closely parallels other
working definitions. In discussing the right to globalization as a core
human right, Michael Pendleton defines the term to mean "the
contemporary tendency for persons, corporations and institutions to
expand out of the confines of a nation or civilization, toward
participation in and identification with a world community. This
expansion takes the form of trade, investment, communications, culture,
sport, citizen affinities, law, and other contacts."5' In addressing the
jurisprudential implications of globalization, Doron M. Kalir offers a
similar formulation: "Globalization refers to those processes which tend
to create and consolidate a unified world economy. ... ""
46. See Davis & Neacsu, supra note 18, at 734 (citing the general failure of a surprising
number of international law experts to define clearly, and therefore to understand clearly,
globalization).
47. See, e.g., Clarence Lusane, Persisting Disparities: Globalization and the Economic
Status of African Americans, 42 How. L.J. 431 (1999) (describing how globalization has con-
tributed to the decline of black economic progress in postindustrial America, but again sans
the crucial definition); Reggie Oh, Comment, Apartheid in America: Residential Segregation
and the Colorline in the Twenty-First Century, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 385, 388 (1995)
(arguing that global economic restructuring may actually accelerate the residential color line
in America, but without actually defining the phrase "global economic restructuring").
48. One World?, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 1997, at 79 ("For good or ill, globalization
has become the buzz-word of the 1990s."). The article goes on to describe events over the past
two decades, the 1980s and the 1990s, that have led to the emergence of this latest manifesta-
tion of economic globalization. Id.
49. These include capital migration, widespread job losses, and the accelerated economic
and social erosion of marginalized communities. See generally Oh, supra note 47.
50. See Davis & Neacsu, supra note 18, at 733.
51. See Pendleton, supra note 4, at 54 (emphasis added).
52. Doron M. Kalir, Taking Globalization Seriously: Towards General Jurisprudence, 39
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 785, 793 (2001) (quoting WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALIZATION AND
LEGAL THEORY 4 (2000)).
[Vol. 23:807
Black Internationalism
In the same vein, Peter Malanczuk, in identifying some of the chal-
lenges that globalization poses to nation-states, has suggested a
categorical segregation of some of the more important features of this
system as a way of providing some much needed definitional clarity. He
identifies the following categories of activity as important: trade and in-
vestment, finances, competition, technology, regulatory capabilities,
world political unification, and, somewhat atypically, the emerging
school of thought generally critical of this process."
While each of these formulations varies to some degree in precise
wording, they consistently stress two elements that appear to represent
indispensable components of a working definition of globalization:
(1) global economic unification under (2) the rule of law. Bearing these
essential elements in mind, we can thus define globalization as an inter-
national process that seeks to integrate or unify disparate national
economic systems under a set of uniform and predictable legal princi-
ples . This formulation will constitute the working definition of
globalization for purposes of this Article.
A. Defining Internationalism
The foregoing analysis begs a deeper question, namely how might an
economics-based model of international black empowerment, or black
internationalism, respond to the economic and legal imperatives of
globalization. This requires that we establish a basic definitional
framework before proceeding, beginning with internationalism, for it is
primarily through its own brand of internationalism that the black
community must respond to the challenges of the emerging global
economic order. As with Pendleton's definition of globalization discussed
above,55 the traditional definition of internationalism56 repeatedly stresses
53. See MALANCZUK, supra note 1, at 50. While admittedly a bit exaggerated in scope and
breadth, at its core, Malanczuk's definition does stress the fundamental economic and regulatory
nature of economic globalization. This type of globalization can be distinguished from other
types of globalization, namely cultural, social, ideological, and linguistic, the latter of which can
be seen by the acceleration to adopt English as the lingua franca of the post-Cold War era.
54. See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon: The Coming Global Legal Order, 37 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 347 (2001) (noting that globalization is largely if not exclusively an economic phe-
nomenon encompassing international trade, international business transactions, production, and
distribution); Robert Knowles, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court's Answer to Glob-
alization, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 735 (2001) (noting that globalization refers to the integration of
markets and nations under the general auspices of free-market capitalism); Chantal Thomas,
Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1451, 1476 (2000)
(defining globalization in terms of international production and consumption).
55. See supra note 4.
56. See generally, RANDOLPH S. BOURNE, WAR AND THE INTELLECTUALS: COLLECTED
ESSAYS, 1915-1919 (Carl Resek ed., 1964), for a penetrating and still pertinent discussion of
internationalism in the wider American context.
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the primacy of creating a global world order governed by relatively
predictable legal norms. 7 I refer to this as internationalism's primary
formulation. This definition grows out of earlier aspirations to create a
peaceful world order governed by an objective, identifiable legal
framework. For example, Richard Gardner has defined (liberal)
internationalism as the "intellectual and political tradition that believes
in the necessity of leadership by liberal democracies in the construction
of a peaceful world order through multilateral cooperation and effective
international organizations."59 In tracing how differing presidential
internationalist perspectives have impacted U.S. compliance with or
opposition to international regulatory regimes, J.M. Spectar has defined
internationalism to mean "a general foreign policy orientation
characterized by international cooperation, international law and
institutions, economic interdependence, international development,
diligence in seeking arms control, and restraint in the use of force.,
61
An analysis of the literature suggests that internationalism is also ac-
corded a secondary meaning or formulation. According to this secondary
formulation, internationalism also refers to the manner in which states
and international actors pursue their particular economic, geopolitical,
and strategic interests in the global arena.6' For example, in exposing
fluctuations in U.S. presidential support for international regulatory re-
gimes like the Global Commons, J.M. Spectar observed that such
support was at its strongest when U.S. political elites perceived the goals
of that regime to be consonant with national interests. Conversely, U.S.
57. See, e.g., Spectar, supra note 40, at 1034, citing Tom J. Farer, International Law: The
Critics Are Wrong, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1988, at 22, 22.
58. See Thomas, supra note 54, at 1479-81 (tracing the rise of the still emerging global
economic order to the enactment of global free trade regimes like the GATT, which passed in
1948, the WTO in 1995, and NAFTA in 1996). It should be noted that the more fundamental
notion of a rule-oriented, peaceful world order can trace its origins to the writings of German
philosopher Immanuel Kant and his theory of Perpetual Peace. Under this theory, Kant identi-
fied as the necessary elements of such an order: (1) the existence of liberal States with
representative governments; (2) a legal framework based on a "federalism of free nations";
and (3) strict compliance with a rule of universal hospitality between States. See Anne-Marie
Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1914-16 (1992). More recently, the doomed League of Nations initia-
tive embraced this ideal by promoting global peace through a system of predictable rules and
regulations.
59. See Richard Gardner, The Comeback of Liberal Internationalism, WASH. Q., Summer
1990, at 23, 23. This stress on the creation of a world order premised on the creation of a
peaceful global world order through the rule of law closely parallels the definition of global-
ization discussed above except that the latter stresses the creation of a distinctly economic
world order. Thus, it would be appropriate, at least for descriptive purposes, to view globaliza-
tion as the primarily economic counterpart to the traditional notion of internationalism widely
embraced by international legal scholars.
60. See Spectar, supra note 40, at 1034.
61. See id. at 1033-34.
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support of that regime waned when the goals of the latter seemed inap-
posite to national interests.62 Spectar attributes this shift to fluctuating
conceptions of an individual candidate's internationalist postures, all the
while recognizing the legitimacy of these fluctuations. From the forego-
ing discussion, one can see that the pursuit of national or individual
interests is also implied in the term "internationalism. '63 Thus we can
define this secondary formulation of internationalism as the pursuit of
national, group, or individual interests within a particular transnational
legal framework.
B. Black Internationalism: A Conceptual Overview
By deploying a similar two-pronged modality, this Article suggests
that black internationalism can also be thought of as encompassing two
distinct paradigms. One paradigm is grounded in the desire to create a
peaceful world order governed by predictable legal mandates, and re-
sponsive to the needs of historically marginalized people. This modality
will be referred to herein as black internationalism's "Pan-African soli-
darity paradigm." The other paradigm remains grounded in the pursuit of
particular black social, economic, and political interests within the large
skein of transnational legal norms. The latter model will be referred to as
black internationalism's "economically grounded modality." This Article
argues that the former paradigm has largely dictated the tenor and focus
of black internationalism for much of the twentieth century, while the
latter has received little or no attention whatsoever. This Article seeks to
redress this perceived imbalance.
Recent attempts to outline a more contemporary formulation of
black internationalism nevertheless reveal an ongoing preoccupation
with the conceptual remnants of Pan-African solidarity. For example,
Henry J. Richardson has suggested that African-American opposition to
South African apartheid and to the Reagan administration's support of
that oppressive regime might serve as a programmatic template for a
more proactive black internationalism.TM According to Richardson, the
unique history of black Americans has imbued them with particular in-
sights into questions of racial justice, for example, mandating that such
interests receive just consideration in the international arena. By exten-
sion, Professor Richardson argues that, in their desire to ensure that
marginalized communities around the world receive fair treatment under
62. See id.
63. See id. (suggesting that international law experts might better predict how nations
will behave within a given transnational context by analyzing the intersection of sovereign
State interests and international law).
64. See Richardson, supra note 41, at 58-64.
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international law, African-Americans have potentially created the moral
and legal foundations of a global black empowerment paradigm.
Richardson's methodology reveals a desire to ensure fair and equitable
treatment of historically marginalized groups under international law,
and a corresponding desire to see these values reflected in progressive
legal scholarship and political activism domestically.
66
Pursuing a similar agenda, although not one specifically grounded
within the contours of black internationalism, Ibrahim Gassama more
recently has criticized those elements of progressive politics that have
hindered the pursuit of racial justice for historically marginalized groups.
Gassama decries what he sees as the tendency of progressive scholarship
to localize racial justice problematics by embracing a "crude and virulent
strain of ethnocentric chauvinism."67 To counter this "crude and virulent
strain," Gassama would link traditional domestic racial subordination
problematics to the larger question of international racial economic sub-
ordination that globalization reinforces. He argues that the international
campaign to preserve the "socioeconomic viability" of Caribbean banana
producers in the face of recent efforts by the United States to dismantle a
European Union banana tariff system economically beneficial to the
Caribbean States, "should be seen as an act of transnational solidarity."
6
For Gassama, this would require that international law and critical
race scholars embrace a model of racial justice premised on what he
terms "a scholarship and politics of solidarity., 69 This scholarship model
would expose the underlying brutality of the global free trade system by
demonstrating how historically marginalized groups continue to suffer
from policies that stress the primacy of capital and labor mobility and
trade liberalization over social welfare and development considerations.
However, Gassama's overt appeal to expressions of "international soli-
darity" suggests that the conceptual decoupling of African-American
from actual Afro-Caribbean interests, for example, is not of primary
concern.
Certainly, a more concerted and coherent expansion of the rather
limited foci of traditional free trade discourse, one that includes an in-
formed discussion of relevant racial justice problematics, seems long
overdue. 0 In this regard, I am in complete agreement with Gassama and
65. See id. at 62-64.
66. See id. at 58-61.
67. Gassama, supra note 8, at 141.
68. Id. at 157.
69. Id. at 141.
70. See, e.g., Dunoff, supra note 10, at 388 (proposing an interdisciplinary approach as
part of the effort to rethink the imperatives of global free trade); see also Thomas, supra note
54, at 1451-55, 1499-1501 (arguing that LatCrit theory can provide an effective counterpoint
[Vol. 23:807
Black Internationalism
Richardson. Nevertheless, and despite this growing scholarly commit-
ment to racial justice principles there is little evidence that black
Americans, or any of the world's countless other economically and po-
litically marginalized ethnic and racial minorities, have actually
benefited from this renewed commitment to these principles. Black
Americans continue to trail their white counterparts in terms of overall
economic progress,7' black influence in formulating U.S. foreign policy
initiatives remains marginal at best," and black institutions have yet to
mature to a level sufficient to promote effectively the material and politi-
cal expectations of their constituents.73 Indeed, the speed at which the
global landscape has altered over the past two decades merely reinforces
an unavoidable truth about black life in postindustrial America: namely,
that black interests will continue to play second fiddle to other more ef-
fectively represented interests so long as black Americans lack the
economic, political, and institutional capacities necessary to promote
effectively and vigorously their collective interests, both domestically
and globally.
In light of these realities, I largely eschew any attempt to merge ra-
cial justice imperatives to the problem of international racial economic
subordination that globalization tends to reinforce . While recognizing
the importance of this approach, and of exposing the causes of transna-
tional racial subordination, I suggest here that strategically an
economically grounded black internationalism can actually enhance con-
temporary expressions of black internationalism by creating a more
influential economic and institutional platform from which to promote
and defend African-American interests.
The idea of an economically grounded black internationalism can
trace its origins to Marcus Garvey and the United Negro Improvement
to the prevailing discourse that champions the globalization phenomenon by showing how the
latter sometimes adversely impacts local interests).
71. See Lusane, supra note 47, at 434-36.
72. The recent inability of black activists like Jesse Jackson, Sr. to persuade the United
States to participate in the United Nations Racism Conference indicates the degree to which
black interests remain largely immaterial in the context of national foreign policy formulation.
73. See Taibi, supra note 11, at 931 (suggesting that black institutions must realign or-
ganizationally and strategically in order to respond to the imperatives of globalization).
74. While there is an emerging consensus that the discourse of rights can no longer en-
sure continued African-American social and economic progress, there is no consensus
concerning the precise parameters of such an alternative substantive model of empowerment.
However, one general point of consensus stressed by the post-rights establishment involves the
transcendence of the traditional civil rights paradigm in favor of a more structuralist orienta-
tion. See, e.g., Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and Political Lawyering
Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 834-39 (1997).
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Association (UNIA) generally.75 By stressing global economic empow-
erment of the race, Garveyism adumbrated a potentially useful paradigm
upon which future global black empowerment initiatives might be built.
Such an approach was particularly suited to addressing persistent racial
subordination problematics. While organizationally flawed,7 6 Garveyism
appeared to understand that a truly effective black internationalism must
attract the support of working-class blacks, a lesson that largely has es-
caped the collective imaginations of contemporary critical race
globalists .
However, W.E.B. Du Bois, along with most educated middle-class
blacks, held Garveyism, as Garvey's approach came to be known, in
disdain in large part because Garveyism appealed to the uneducated
black masses.78 In sharp contrast to Garvey's particular brand of black
internationalism, stressing as it did the pursuit of core black economic
interests, black internationalism throughout most of the twentieth
century, has more routinely pursued those goals championed by the
traditional formulation of liberal internationalism.
This tendency can be seen in the black community's aggressive op-
position of South African apartheid and constructive engagement, its
general support of anticolonialism movements, and more recently, sup-
75. See EDMUND DAVID CRONON, BLACK MOSES: THE STORY OF MARCUS GARVEY AND
THE UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION 3 (1962). Cronon writes:
In the years immediately following World War I there developed among the Ne-
groes of the world a mass movement of considerable influence and importance.
Under the leadership of a remarkable Jamaican Negro, Marcus Garvey, the Univer-
sal Negro Improvement Association [hereinafter UNIA] attracted the attention of
the colored world to a degree never before achieved by a Negro organization.
Garvey's activities were world-wide in scope, and his organization had members
scattered from Africa to California, from Nova Scotia to South America.
Id.
76. The underlying organizational imperatives of Garveyism certainly deserve greater at-
tention, especially in light of the growing body of scholarship dealing with the law and
organizing movement. Unfortunately, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
77. One sometimes forgets that prominent internationalists like W.E.B. Du Bois were not
products of the industrial working class, but part of the black intellectual bourgeoisie. Thus, in
spite of his extraordinary intellectual gifts, it is arguable that Du Bois's inability to truly un-
derstand working-class blacks was his greatest shortcoming as a black leader. See DAVID
LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. Du Bols: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 55 (1993) ("He [Du Bois] would
finally meet other people of color like himself. They were still a mystery, these vibrant peo-
ple....").
78. See CRONON, supra note 75, at 73-74 (1962) (noting that part of the difficulty of
organizing African-Americans stemmed from the traditional distrust of the upper classes for
any mass group movement); see also W.E.B. Du Bols, Africa and the American Negro
Intelligentsia, in W.E.B. Du Bols: A READER, supra note 43, at 401. ("[Garvey] promoted an
African movement, but it was purely commercial and based on no conception of African
history or its needs.") (emphasis added). Du Bois himself found the liberationist impulses of
the Free African societies more compelling intellectually. Id.
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port for Caribbean banana producers engaged in a vicious international
trade war.7 9 What has emerged is a black internationalism paralyzed by
its inability to resolve the underlying tensions between the competing
paradigms of self interest on the one hand, and Pan-African solidarity on
the other. Whether under the guise of Pan-Africanism or global solidar-
ity, black liberation from white racism, or some other model, recent
expressions of black internationalism like the Free South Africa Move-
ment or efforts to avert a costly trade war over preferential banana tariffs
reveal an institution hampered by conceptual contradictions, lacking an
ideological center, and disconnected from the basic economic and social
concerns of most blacks. 8°
This Article posits one approach to resolve this impasse, the adop-
tion of an economically grounded black internationalism. As the
foregoing analysis suggests, the interconnectedness and increasingly
complex challenges of the global landscape renders such a fundamental
shift in African-American institutional thinking all but unavoidable.'
II. HISTORICAL EXPRESSIONS OF BLACK INTERNATIONALISM
Traditional patterns of collective African-American opposition to, or
involvement in particular international conflicts, have mirrored the stra-
tegic protest models of the black civil rights movement.82 Moreover,
black internationalism typically has engaged a rather limited range of
concerns and interests, but has never veered far astray from the prevail-
ing civil rights orthodoxy that has characterized the bulk of collective
black action throughout most of the twentieth century. This model of
collective social mobilization through protest is not surprising given the
particularities of the civil rights struggles of the 1960s, and of the unde-
niable appeal of Pan-African solidarity.83 A representative though hardly
79. See generally Michelle Williams, Comment, Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk
by Banana Trade War?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 163 (2000) (arguing that dismantling
the EU trade regime will have disastrous effects on the economies of the banana producing
States).
80. See MARABLE, supra note 39, at 194-96 (advocating the adoption by black activists
of a modality that stresses substantive black interests as well as the racial justice interests of
oppressed minorities like black South Africans).
81. See LEIMAN, supra note 16, for an excellent discussion of race, class, and empower-
ment strategies, albeit with a strong socialist tenor. Professor Leiman synthesizes critical
political and economic historicism to argue that American racism has its roots in the exploita-
tive nature of global capitalist expansion, and that any model of empowerment must address
the persistent inequities of class and race in this society.
82. See generally MARABLE, supra note 39.
83. See HAROLD CRUSE, THE CRISIS OF THE NEGRO INTELLECTUAL 5-6 (1967) (tracing
the emergence of African-American Pan-Africanism to Martin R. Delany, a leading Abolition-
ist and early Black Nationalist who influenced the thinking of W.E.B. Du Bois). Du Bois
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comprehensive historical assessment of black internationalism will more
clearly reveal the recurrence of these tendencies and will also suggest an
alternative approach to this modality.
A. Assessing the Free South African Movement
The largely black-led" domestic Free South Africa Movement
(FSAM) that emerged in the mid-1980s remains perhaps the most visible
and successful (at least in light of its stated objectives) example of
African-American, or as I prefer for purely stylistic reasons, black
internationalism. In form as well as content, the FSAM provides a
revealing glimpse into the national and global potentialities of an
economically oriented black internationalism, and also suggests the
inherent limitations of that institution in its current form.
The FSAM emerged in response to South Africa's oppressive policy
of apartheid." To mask the inherent brutality and callousness of its cor-
porate-friendly foreign policy preferences, the Reagan administration
concocted a policy known as "constructive engagement." Constructive
engagement was ostensibly founded on the belief that the United States
could best influence the formulation of a more humane South African
policy of racialism by maintaining close political and economic ties with
the apartheid regime.86 The Reagan administration reasoned that
disengagement would limit the political and economic influence
America might exercise over the South African government." In light of
this belief, the administration elected to pursue a policy that stressed
closer economic, military, and political ties between the two nations, to
the exclusion of isolating South Africa politically and economically for
its racist domestic policies.
himself embraced Pan-Africanism as a global empowerment strategy, in addition to his more
widely known support of racial integration under the auspices of the NAACP. Id.
84. By "black-led" I simply refer to the fact that much of the initial resistive thrust of the
domestic Free South Africa Movement (FSAM) originated in the African-American commu-
nity. Of course, at its zenith, the FSAM united activists representing a wide spectrum of class,
race, and political perspective.
85. South African Apartheid was a system of racial segregation and subjugation main-
tained through the use of force and terror against non-white South Africans (and white South
Africans who opposed that system). The South African apartheid system rested on two ideo-
logical pillars: the preservation of white political, economic, and social superiority, and the
preservation of white genetic purity through strict physical separation of the races. Paul Sauer,
a senior official in the National Party (the political party of P.W. Botha and F.W. DeKlerrk)
first elaborated the policy in 1946. See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA
185-86 (1990).
86. See generally SOUTH AFRICA AND THE UNITED STATES: THE DECLASSIFIED HISTORY
(Kenneth Mokoena ed., 1993).
87. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker is credited officially
as the architect of the policy known as "constructive engagement." See PAULINE H. BAKER,
THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH AFRICA: THE REAGAN YEARS 22-53 (1989).
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On November 21, 1984, Randall Robinson, the President of
Transafrica, a Washington, D.C. based think-tank, Congressman Walter
Fauntroy and Mary Frances Berry, peaceably occupied the South African
Embassy." The protestors refused to leave the Embassy grounds until the
South African government agreed to release all of its political prisoners
and to dismantle the apartheid system.89 Thus began on the domestic
front the pivotal social protest movement that would culminate almost a
decade later with the release from prison of Nelson Mandela.9° In the
following months, thousands of concerned citizens protested in front of
the South African Embassy, often suffering arrest at the hands of the
Washington, D.C. police force.9' The domestic FSAM targeted three key
points: (1) the dismantling of the apartheid system; (2) the release of all
political prisoners, including Mr. Mandela, from South African prisons;
and (3) the divestiture of all U.S. financial holdings in South Africa by
our government, major colleges and universities, and corporations.
Certainly, one can trace the origin of points (1) and (2) to the initial list
of demands that Randall Robinson and his supporters presented to the
South African Ambassador Bernardus G. Fouries on November 21, 1984,
88. RANDALL ROBINSON, DEFENDING THE SPIRIT: A BLACK LIFE IN AMERICA 151-52
(1998).
89. See id. at 152.
90. In addition to the U.S.-based FSAM, the global struggle against apartheid took place
on a number of fronts. Within South Africa, the African National Congress waged an aggres-
sive anti-apartheid campaign, and also forged ties with regional anti-apartheid activists in
countries like Namibia. Growing discontent in the Third World more generally led to stronger
condemnations of the South African regime and indirectly, to the passage of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination on December 21, 1965,
by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
91. I lived in Washington, D.C. at the time of the FSAM protests. Nightly news broad-
casts detailing which celebrities had been arrested during the day filled the local airwaves. As
a student at Howard University at the time, I vividly recall the degree to which the FSAM
mobilized huge cross sections of the black community, regardless of class. I also recall that on
most other issues, the Washington, D.C. black community remained divided, especially along
class lines. While working-class blacks overwhelmingly supported Mayor Marion Barry
because of his populist appeal; middle-class blacks largely did not, myself included. Working-
class blacks also gravitated to the southernmost neighborhoods of the District while middle-
class blacks migrated to Prince George's County, a relatively prosperous black middle-class
suburban enclave in Maryland. Progressive radical politics remained a viable alternative in the
lives of working-class blacks living in the racially mixed neighborhoods of that time, such as
Adams Morgan (now completely gentrified and no longer a working-class neighborhood). I
fondly recall a local communist bookstore near 16th Street and Columbia Avenue that catered
to intellectually disaffected students at Howard University and to local activists. The political
picture was quite different amongst middle-class blacks. Many of them worked in some capac-
ity for the federal government, either as employees or as consultants and advisors. Needless to
say, their dependence on the federal government as a source of employment profoundly lim-
ited both their willingness and ability to explore political options outside of the two-party
mainstream. I address the impact that this intra-group, black-on-black class disjuncture has
had on black internationalism more fully in Section II.C infra.
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when they occupied the embassy.92 It is unclear who originally proposed
the complete divestiture of all holdings in South African property, stocks
and bonds, and other investments, by the U.S. government, along with
major U.S.-based colleges, universities, and corporations.93 By the mid-
1 980s, however, divestiture had become the third central feature of the
domestic FSAM.94
Despite its apparent success in helping to end apartheid, however, it
is not at all clear that the black community derived any lasting
substantive benefits from its not insignificant participation in the FSAM.
In large part, this owed to the fact that domestic black economic
empowerment was never an express goal of the FSAM. In recognizing
this shortfall, historian Manning Marable has suggested that the FSAM
failed to spur more radical expressions of black internationalism because
black foreign policy elites behind the movement failed to link a
progressive political agenda to deeper black political and economic
interests.95 Marable has noted a number of underlying economic features
of the apartheid system that implicated domestic black economic
interests, but which were never publicly recognized as motives for black
involvement in the FSAM. These included: (1) tacit American corporate
support of South African apartheid because that system suppressed black
South African and colored wages and encouraged labor transfers away
from the United States to South Africa; and (2) large-scale purchases of
South African products such as steel over readily available American
steel because racially suppressed wages rendered South African steel
cheaper, to cite two examples. 96
For Marable then, one potential programmatic option involves link-
ing a radical black internationalism to specific global and domestic
economic and labor considerations. 97 Implicit in Marable's proposal is
the conviction that a critically realigned black internationalism must at-
tempt to expose the particular features of economic globalization that
have historically limited black economic and social progress in America.
92. See ROBINSON, supra note 87, at 152.
93. See Ann-Catherine Blank, The South African Divestment Debate: Factoring "Politi-
cal Risk" Into the Prudent Investor Rule, 55 U. GIN. L. REv. 201 (1986) (assessing some of
the financial implications of divestment vis-A-vis investor strategies).
94. See MARABLE, supra note 39, at 192.
95. See id. at 194-95. Ironically, the third feature of the FSAM, divestiture, loosely
hinted at the underlying economic imperatives that underscore the apartheid system and the
multinational corporations that benefited from that system's practice of artificially suppressing
wages along color lines in order to attract foreign investment. Unfortunately, the seeds of a
radical black internationalism premised on exposing these distortions and linking them to the
material aspirations of working-class blacks never materialized.
96. See id. at 192-94.
97. See id.
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In this sense, Marable's formulation of racial justice appears to stress
economic equity over the more formalistic racial justice paradigms
championed by civil and human rightists. At a minimum, his formulation
gives equal weight to both economic considerations and civil-human
rights aspirations under the banner of Pan-Africanism."
With its emphasis on substantive economic criteria, Marable's con-
viction that black internationalism actively addresses questions of
economic equity and empowerment has profound implications. First, his
proposal would provide a broader conceptual and pragmatic framework
than does the predominant Pan-African solidarity approach. Second, be-
cause the objective is to link black internationalism to a broader range of
international economic problematics, an economically grounded, prag-
matic orientation would provide a more effective model for meeting
these challenges. This is not to suggest that an economically oriented
black internationalism should seek to influence global problematics only
insofar as specific material African-American interests are implicated.
The adoption of an ideological and programmatic platform as limiting as
this would run the risk of increasing African-American global and
domestic isolation and marginalization. 99 Rather, an economically driven
black internationalism must effectively accomplish several tasks. It must
promote core black economic and political interests. It also must strive
to link those interests, ideologically and programmatically, to larger in-
ternational law, economic, and political problematics. For example, in
the FSAM, an economically driven black internationalism would have
exposed not only the substantive labor and wage disruptions of the
apartheid system sanctioned by the Reagan administration's policy of
constructive engagement, it also would have exposed the transatlantic
collusion between the United States, Great Britain, and France in per-
petuating the apartheid regime through the collusion between the
military infrastructures of those States, the gross human rights abuses
98. The task of putting in place a more radical black internationalism along the lines pro-
posed by Marable is rendered more difficult by the historic unwillingness of the black middle
class to think critically about global capitalism (economic globalization) and the impact that
system has had on black lives. It is precisely this unwillingness to assess critically the
strengths and weaknesses of global capitalism that undermines the long-term effectiveness of
a civil rights-oriented African-American internationalism, shunting its true radical potential.
See LEIMAN, supra note 16, at 310 (arguing that the pro-capitalist position of affluent blacks
often conflicts with the radical tendencies of the black underclass and certain elements of the
black intelligentsia). Leiman attributes this disjuncture to the desire of the black middle class
to protect hard-won economic gains, gains that might be threatened by those who "buck the
power structure too vigorously." Id.
99. See Du Bois, supra note 78, at 401-02 (arguing that the failure to wed local concerns
to global problematics compounds black intellectual, cultural, and economic isolation).
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this collusion facilitated, and their impact on black political and eco-
nomic progress at home.
Lastly, Marable's analysis suggests that an informed, proactive, eco-
nomically grounded black internationalism cannot rely exclusively or
even primarily on moralistic appeals or perceived Pan-African solidarity
as a basis for collective black mobilization against transnational viola-
tions of international law. Such determinations tend toward the
subjective and their ability to mobilize opposition collectively is highly
unpredictable.' ° Indeed, as argued in the next Section, the reliance on
such appeals and on a frequently advocated but largely unqualified Pan-
African solidarity rendered African-American opposition to U.S. foreign
trade policy initiatives in the Bananas war wholly ineffective.
B. Bananas, Trade, and the Limitations of Pan-Africanism
The Bananas war,'0 ' a long-standing and highly complex international
trade dispute with potentially far-reaching racial justice implications, is a
more recent international conflict that has drawn the attention of black
internationalists and critical race globalists.' 2 As spelled out below, this
100. In the 1930s, for example, hundreds of African-Americans voluntarily assisted
Spanish revolutionaries in their struggle against General Franco's fascist regime. More telling,
their efforts drew the praise and garnered the financial support of prominent African-American
intellectuals like the revered Paul Robeson. See Robeson Calls for Aid to Negroes Defending
Democracy in Spain, THE NEGRO WORKER, June 1937, at 9, reprinted in PAUL ROBESON
SPEAKS 118 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1978). By way of eerie contrast, the African-American com-
munity remained largely silent when fascist Italy invaded and devastated Ethiopia in the
1930s, despite the patent illegality of Italy's actions under international law. If a sense of Pan-
African commonality proved inadequate to prompt to action black internationalists in that
instance, this suggests the inadvisability of basing any formulation of black internationalism
upon a symbolic Pan-African framework, however appealing such a framework might appear
on an emotional level.
101. There is a growing interest on the part of international trade scholars to assess the
legal and economic impact of the Bananas war, although largely from a trade and foreign
policy perspective. See generally, Zsolt K. Bessko, Going Bananas over EEC Preferences?: A
Look at the Banana Trade War and the WTO's Understanding on Rules and Procedures Gov-
erning the Settlement of Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 265 (1996); Raj Bhala, The
Bananas War, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 839 (2000); Richard Lyons, European Union Banana
Controversy, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 165 (1994); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Prevention and Settle-
ment of International Trade Disputes Between the European Union and the United States, 8
TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 233 (2000); Hale Sheppard, The Lome Convention in the Next Mil-
lennium: Modification of the Trade/Aid Package and Support for Regional Integration, 7 KAN.
J.L. & PuB. PoCL, Spring 1998, at 84; Williams, supra note 78; Rodrigo Bustamante, Note,
The Need for a GATI' Doctrine of Locus Standi: Why the United States Cannot Stand the
European Community's Banana Import Regime, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 533 (1997); Jack
J. Chen, Note, Going Bananas: How the WTO Can Heal the Split in the Global Banana Trade
Dispute, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283 (1995).
102. See Gassama, supra note 8, at 157 (arguing that the Bananas war "was fundamen-
tally about the alienation and devastation caused to multiple communities across national
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case highlights, albeit on a relatively small scale, precisely the type of
economic dislocation and disregard for minority interests that has drawn
fire from the opponents of globalization. For black internationalists, how-
ever, the Bananas war also represents an instance where their inability to
discern the essential economic, as opposed to the moral, character of the
underlying dispute, significantly undermined their ability to impact the
dispute's ultimate outcome. This suggests a failure to grasp the overriding
importance the global free trade system places on economic interests but
not on social, cultural, human welfare, or other noneconomic values. At
another level, the Bananas war reveals a deeper historic failure on the part
of black internationalists and their Pan-African allies to give economic and
political substance to the overarching moral framework that has largely
guided black internationalism's Pan-Africanist trajectory for much of the
twentieth century.
Briefly put, the dispute involved a preferential banana tariff system
adopted by the European Union Economic Community (EEC) in 1975,
revised in 1989, and finally implemented in 1993 under the Lome
Convention. °3 The Convention's preferential banana tariff system was
originally created to support the fragile, export dependent economies of
certain African, Caribbean, and Pacific States (ACP States), all former
European colonies. °'0 Under this arrangement, the participating EU
States agreed to waive the standard per ton duty typically assessed
against imports of ACP-produced bananas."5 This preferential treatment
would allow the smaller, less efficient ACP producers and exporters to
compete price-wise with the larger multinational banana producers.i6
boundaries by multinational corporations lacking deep or lasting connections to any commu-
nity or nation").
103. See African, Caribbean and Pacific States-European Economic Community: Final
Act, Minutes and Fourth ACP-EEC Convention of Lome, Dec. 15 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (1990)
[hereinafter Lome Convention]. The so-called banana protocol was implemented to provide
the ACP States greater access to EU banana markets by improving local marketing and pro-
duction conditions for those producer States. Id. The portion of the "banana protocol" under
review here is Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93 of 13 February 1993 on the Organization of
the Market in Bananas, 1993 O.J. (L47) [hereinafter EEC 404/93].
104. The ACP States include seventy African, Caribbean, and Pacific Rim countries. In
the instant dispute, the Caribbean actors include Martinique, Guadeloupe, Dominica, St. Lu-
cia, and St. Vincent. Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent rely on banana exports for nearly
half of their export earnings, a staggering figure.
105. The preference waives the provisions of article 1, paragraph I of the GATT and al-
lows participating EU States to provide preferential tariff treatment to products originating in
the ACP States. See WTO Dispute Settlement Report of the Appellate Body on European
Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas,
WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Report]; see also EEC
404/93, supra note 103, at 1.
106. These producers include, for example, Dole Bananas and Chiquita Brands Interna-
tional, Inc. It is worth-noting that France, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the recipient ACP
States remain the system's strongest supporters, even in the face of legal attacks from the
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By way of contrast, the multinational producers enjoyed impressive
economies of scale that allowed them to produce bananas more effi-
ciently and cheaply than the ACP producers. 7 It bears mentioning that
the total ACP banana crop accounts for a relatively small percentage of
the world's total banana production levels. The multinational and non-
ACP producers, on the other hand, control roughly 90 percent of the
world banana production and sales markets.' 8 Most of the ACP bananas
go to Europe under the terms of the Lome Convention where they avoid
many of the tariffs imposed on non-ACP bananas. Acting on behalf of a
petition filed by Chiquita Brands International, Inc. and the Hawaii Ba-
nana Industry Association under section 301 of the United States Trade
Act, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) challenged the EU-
ACP arrangement as a violation of the non-discrimination provisions of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." Specifically, the
USTR alleged that Council Regulation (EEC) 404/93 (hereinafter EEC
404/93), the quota system under review, violated the non-discrimination
provisions of article 13(2) of the GATT." ° The USTR claimed that by
exempting ACP banana imports from select tariff obligations, the EU
had violated article 13(2)'s non-discrimination provisions, thereby injur-
ing U.S. banana producers by putting them at a distinct price
disadvantage. "'
This dispute was not merely a thinly disguised variant of post-Cold
War American versus Western European trade oppositionalism, as one
scholar has suggested."12 Importantly, the Bananas war also pitted
European allies against one another, revealing the highly volatile and
United States, several Latin American producer States, and even other EU States. See First
Submission of the United States of America in European Communities-Regime for the Im-
portation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 1997 WL 397092 (WTO July 9, 1996).
107. It is worth noting that in the fall of 2001, Dole Bananas, one of the world's largest
multinational banana producers, filed for bankruptcy protection. One of the reasons cited by
Dole for the decline in international sales was the alleged adverse impact of the Lome Con-
vention tariff preferences that favored ACP banana imports over non-ACP imports.
108. See ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 248-49.
109. The USTR is an executive office that oversees U.S. foreign trade policy. Section
301 of the United States Trade Act of 1974 empowers the President, through his or her desig-
nated representative, to investigate and possibly initiate retaliatory trade measures against
States that violate the non-discrimination provisions of the GATT. Typically, the USTR initi-
ates such an investigation after receiving a petition from an allegedly aggrieved party.
Following the investigation, the USTR can either decline to act or she or he can pursue a claim
before the WTO. See Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301-09, amended by 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2415
(1988).
110. Article 13(2) of the GATT mandates that any member who erects an import restric-
tion must do so in a non-discriminatory manner, and in a way least disruptive of free trade.
GAIT art. 13(2).
111. See Case C-280/93, F.R.G. v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5039, 34 I.L.M. 154 (1995).
112. See, e.g., Petersmann, supra note 101.
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divisive nature of the conflict. Germany, later joined by Belgium and the
Netherlands, (the "EU complainants") actually filed a complaint against
the European Council on May 23, 1993. Germany argued that EEC
404/93 violated an earlier protocol that permitted Germany to import a
specific quota of bananas duty free. Thus, Germany sought to protect her
own economic interests in the underlying dispute, despite the posture
adopted by those States that supported EEC 404/93.
Collectively, the EU complainants objected to the Lome provisions
on the grounds that they violated: (1) the rules and objectives of the
Treaty of Rome; (2) basic property rights and the concept of nondis-
crimination under EU law; and (3) the concept of nondiscrimination
under the GATT. The European Court of Justice ultimately rejected the
claims of the EU complainants.'1 3 However, the Court's rejection did
nothing to disguise the fact that on foreign trade policy grounds, the
States of the EU remained deeply divided over the desirability of the
trade regime put in place under EEC 404/93. Adding to this complexity,
Spain, Greece, Italy, France, Portugal, and Great Britain joined the
Committee of European Communities in opposing EEC 404/93."14
Yet another group of complainants, this time Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Venezuela (the
"Latin American complainants"), challenged the Lome tariff provisions
before a specially convened GATT panel because EEC 404/93 ostensibly
violated prior EU obligations of nondiscrimination toward those com-
plainants.' 5 As with their ACP counterparts, agricultural exports play an
important role in the economic life of the Latin American producer
States." 16 The Latin American complainants ultimately succeeded in con-
vincing the EU to modify significantly the Lome provisions in the form
of a so-called "Framework Agreement."' 7
In support of EEC 404/93, the ACP States and their European allies
argued that any effort to dismantle the Lome tariff system would lead to
the collapse of the banana-export dependent economies of the ACP
States.'18 Moreover, the ACP producers, some of whom have apparently
113. See ER.G. v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. at 1-5043-44,34 I.L.M. at 155.
114. See id. at 1-5043-44, In 2-5, 34 I.L.M. at 167, 1 2-5.
115. See WTO Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 105.
116. See generally Nathaniel Sheppard, Jr., Expected Banana Export Boom Turns into
Bust for Central America; EC Quotas Add Stiff Tariffs, J. CoM., Aug. 3, 1993, at 5A. The
multinationals have also invested heavily in the Latin American banana industry, resulting in
the latter enjoying significant economies of scale over their ACP counterparts. See also Wil-
liam Dullforce, EC Tries to Straighten Out Banana Problem, FIN. TIMES LTD., Oct. 18, 1990,
at 38.
117. See WTO Dispute Settlement Report, supra note 105.
118. See Williams, supra note 79, at 180 (noting the adverse economic impact disman-
tling the banana trade regime under EEC 404/93 will have on the Caribbean banana-producing
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already shifted to illicit drug production, have warned that dismantling
the Lome regime would result in a large-scale shift away from banana
production to the production of illicit drugs, most of which would be
destined for U.S. markets. " 9
Transafrica, along with select members of the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives' Congressional Black Caucus, including Representative
Maxine Waters ("the Coalition"), spearheaded domestic opposition to
the USTR's planned challenge of EEC 404/93."0 During a series of
meetings with then-USTR Mickey Kantor, the Coalition argued against
the proposed U.S. challenge to EEC 404/93. The Coalition stressed that
any attempt to dismantle the Lome tariff system through the World Trade
Organization (WTO) would have disastrous results for the ACP econo-
mies given their dependence on banana export revenues generated from
sales to the EU.'2 ' Available figures indicate that roughly 45 percent of
the bananas consumed in the EU come from the eight key ACP banana
producers.' The Coalition also stressed that dismantling the trade pref-
erence regime under EEC 404/93 would encourage, and indeed, pave the
way for many of the smaller Caribbean producers to turn to drug produc-
tion as the most likely economic alternative to growing bananas.' 3
Finally, the Coalition argued that the USTR's position smacked of for-
eign policy hypocrisy because it stressed corporate profits over the
economic needs and political stability of the Caribbean States, our osten-
sible democratic allies in the region.'24
States); see also ROBINSON, supra note 87, at 248. In more general terms, the basic argument
is: Multinational Firm A commands approximately 60 percent of the international market in a
certain commodity. Its market dominance has gone unchallenged for nearly thirty years. The
Firm wants to penetrate new markets in small developing countries, including the markets of
some developing States newly admitted to the GATTIWTO system. However, Firm A finds its
dominance challenged in some of these States because of price supports extended to less effi-
cient State run firms that mask their productive inefficiencies. Firm A, frustrated by its
inability to penetrate these markets, persuades its foreign trade delegate to launch a proceed-
ing before the WTO challenging the local price support program as a violation of GATT non-
discrimination rules. Applying rules grounded in the principles of facial neutrality and eco-
nomic efficiency, the WTO rules the price support system untenable under the GATT article
13(2) framework despite the impact such a move is likely to have on local workers and local
economic conditions.
119. See Williams, supra note 79, at 180-83.
120. See ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 248.
121. See id.
122. See Starla Henrichs-Cohen, EEC Treaty Article 115-The Surviving Safeguard:
Ridding Residual Member State Protection in the Single Market, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
553, 553-87 (1993).
123. See Williams, supra note 79, at 180-83.
124. See ROBINSON, supra note 88, at 250.
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Ultimately, the USTR decided to proceed with the U.S. challenge,
despite the forceful objections voiced by the Transafrica Coalition.' The
question remains: Given such insistent and vocal opposition to the
USTR's challenge, and given the potentially disastrous economic and
social consequences that the challenge posed to the Caribbean States,
26
why did the Transafrica Coalition nevertheless fail to alter the trajectory
of U.S. foreign trade policy in a way that would benefit the ACP produc-
ers?
First, as the brief summary of the Bananas war above indicates, this
highly complex international trade dispute was not particularly well-
suited to the type of transnational activism practiced by groups like
Transafrica. Unlike the FSAM, a cause that evoked strong public
sympathy'27 and which highlighted the racial ambiguities of U.S. foreign
policy as they impacted African-Americans,' 28 this arcane and little-
understood dispute over EU banana tariff preferences never struck a
resounding chord with the American public, black or otherwise. Nor did
this dispute impact black economic interests in any demonstrable way.
Instead, the Bananas war involved a series of highly technical and
interrelated disputes that most observers only partially understood-an
altercation involving the intricacies of trade import tariffs, conflicting
multinational treaty mandates, competing spheres of global political and
economic influence, 29 obscure WTO panel decisions, and the like. While
125. The dispute over the legality of EEC 404/93 is ongoing. Generally, the WTO has
tended to side with the United States and those parties opposed to the banana tariff regime.
With the adoption of Council Regulation No. 1637/98 on July 20, 1998, the EU attempted to
address the concerns of the WTO and the United States over the discriminatory impact of EEC
404/93, but the United States remained unconvinced. More recently, the WTO determined that
the United States suffers approximately $191.4 million per year in damages as a result of the
preferential banana tariff system. See Williams, supra note 79, 174-80; see also Bhala, supra
note 101, at 839 (noting that the U.S.-EU Bananas war has also adversely impacted U.S.-EU
trade relations, in addition to the damage inflicted on the economies of the Caribbean and
other ACP banana producing states).
126. It is worth noting that the Latin American challengers have alleged the loss of
thousands of jobs as a result of the preferential tariff regime set up under EEC 404/93. See
Global Banana Crisis Threatens Central American Unions and Wages, NEWSLETTER (U.S.-
Labor Education in the Americas Project), Dec. 1999, at http://usleap.org/Banana/crisis/
CrisisaThreatl2-99.html.
127. See, e.g., Gassama, supra note 8, at 153 (observing that the appeal of the FSAM
owed as much to substantive issues as it did to television broadcast images of "brave South
Africans fighting and dying for freedom" in their struggle against apartheid).
128. See MARABLE, supra note 39, at 192-95.
129. Clearly, a complete discussion of the entire range of interests implicated by the Ba-
nanas war is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say, the range of interests
involved-including numerous sovereign States, local and multinational producers, suppliers,
distributors, as well as regional and international trading blocks-suggests the futility of any
attempt to reduce this dispute to a series of basic concepts.
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of scholarly interest to a few international trade experts, this is not the
stuff of widespread black activism of the sort seen during the FSAM.
Second, while it remains true that antiglobalization demonstrations
in cities like Genoa, Italy, Washington, D.C., Seattle, Washington, and
Quebec City, Canada, have effectively drawn attention to a growing
wellspring of popular discontent over the perceived failure of globaliza-
tion generally to improve the living standards of the world's poor, such
overt appeals to global solidarity obfuscate a much deeper problem. Spe-
cifically, it is not clear that the type of global solidarity implied by these
protests generally, or advocated by critics like Gassama in support of the
ACP banana producers specifically,30 can be implemented on a wide-
spread level given that various interest groups may often possess
conflicting political agendas and economic motivations. In the Bananas
war, this tension stemmed from conflicting economic loyalties that ren-
dered any such coalition building highly unlikely. Thus, it is not at all
clear that appeals to unite behind the ACP producers would have gener-
ated much sympathy, let alone support, from the Latino community
given that a number of Latin American States actually opposed the EU
preferential tariff system. 3' The Latin American complainants opposed
the preferential tariff system because multinational producers like Chi-
quita and Dole operate large plantations in these countries, providing
jobs and much-needed tax revenues." Because of their close economic
ties to the multinational producers, EEC 404/93 threatened the economic
viability of these Latin American States, many of whom remain export
dependent as well.'33
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the proponents of a more
proactive and critical black internationalism, the conflict reveals the pri-
macy the global free trade system places on concrete economic interests.
Thus, despite the vastly competing postures assumed by the parties, each
of their respective positions could ultimately be tied to a set of demon-
strable economic interests. For example, the ACP States, especially the
Caribbean actors, sought to preserve the preferential tariff system em-
bodied in EEC 404/93 because these export dependent States owed their
130. See Gassama, supra note 8, at 157 (exhorting concerned parties to support EEC
404/93 as a matter of global solidarity).
131. See First Submission of the United States, 1997 WL 397092, at *37-39.
132. See id.
133. The potential for similar conflicts of interest to emerge appears all but unavoidable.
More immediately, such conflicts represent a significant barrier to the creation of global coali-
tions to combat the perceived ills of economic globalization. I address these concerns in an
unpublished manuscript tentatively titled Assessing the Critical Race Implications of the Ba-
nana Wars. Beyond the Discourse of Free Trade (forthcoming).
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economic viability to the benefits derived from that system.34 The U.S.
multinational producers, on the other hand, sought to dismantle that
same tariff regime under the auspices of section 301 of the United States
Trade Act because the preferential treatment extended to ACP imports
limited the ability of the multinationals to obtain import licenses for their
products.'35 The Latin American complainants, eager to pursue new agri-
cultural markets,'36 sought to penetrate European produce markets more
aggressively. However, despite their superior economies of scale and
productive capabilities, the Latin American complainants found "that the
presence of such great production resources is of no value if they are
deprived of the full utility of their productive capacity. Jobs and eco-
nomic gain can only be realized if the production capability can be
utilized" in the way of international sales.'37
By way of notable contrast, challenges to the USTR's position by
the Coalition relied primarily on moral appeals largely unrelated to the
free trade imperatives that defined this dispute. This posture suggests a
deeper inability on the part of the Coalition and its members to distin-
guish between the moral imperatives that underscored the conflict, and
the economic ones that ultimately won out. These events also highlight
an important truth regarding U.S. foreign policy formulation, especially
U.S. foreign trade initiatives. Namely, that national governments, includ-
ing our own, will embark on a particular course of action that some find
morally objectionable, so long as the political and economic benefits of
those initiatives outweigh the potential risks that adverse publicity is
likely to generate.
At a deeper level, the Bananas war underscored the relative absence
of any underlying substantive economic connections, beyond the
symbolic, between African-Americans and the ACP States. While
appeals based on a perceived solidarity of moral convictions were
commonplace,'38 less apparent were appeals to defend the shared
economic interests of black Americans and their Caribbean counterparts.
This largely owes to the historic failure of these selfsame actors to
establish any such common substantive linkages in a coherent fashion.
African-Americans did not own production facilities in the ACP States,
nor were they significant importers of ACP bananas, except perhaps as
base consumers. In short, no solidarity of economic interests could be
134. See Lorraine Woellert, Latin American Bananas Focus of EU Import Proposal,
WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 1998, at B10, available at LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
135. See Bessko, supra note 101, at 283.
136. See Lyons, supra note 101, at 172.
137. See id. at 173.
138. See Gassama, supra note 8, 133-42 (appealing to notions of global moral solidar-
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cited because none existed. In this sense, Pan-Africanism lacked an
underlying economic platform that could give substance to its moral
foundations, ultimately rendering African-American involvement in the
Bananas war ineffectual.
C. The Roots of an Economically Grounded Black Internationalism:
Marcus Garvey and the Black Star Line
Collective black opposition to South African apartheid and to U.S.
constructive engagement, and the Transafrica Coalition's unsuccessful
lobbying efforts on behalf of Caribbean banana producers in the Bananas
war reveal two defining features of black internationalism that warrant
further discussion. First, black internationalism has historically reflected
a desire to ensure that similarly situated people of African descent re-
ceive fair treatment under international law. Thus, the global struggle for
racial justice under international law can be seen as an extension of the
African-American struggle for de jure equality in American society. 39
Moreover, some commentators suggest that the perceived interconnect-
edness of Pan-African and African-American international law interests
can serve as a model of black empowerment, at least when it comes to
ensuring U.S. executive branch compliance with national binding obliga-
tions under international law, as in the FSAM. 0 This particular
trajectory of black internationalism, one propelled largely by a rights-
oriented, symbolically compelling model of Pan-African solidarity, has
remained dominant during much of the twentieth century.
Second, black internationalism has typically followed a hierarchical,
top-down model of collective engagement and mobilization.'4 ' That is,
black internationalism was and largely remains a preoccupation of the
black intelligentsia. Thus, with few exceptions,"4 it has largely fallen to
139. See Richardson, supra note 41, at 65 (arguing that African-American international-
ism "indicates a knowledgeable involvement by African-Americans in the international
community based on the importance of projecting principles and lessons of their historical
struggle in the United States into the international community on major questions of war,
peace and law.").
140. See id. at 63.
141. The most notable exception to this model of black internationalism involved Mar-
cus Garvey's failed Black Star Line shipping company and his ill-fated Back to Africa
movement. However, certain members of the black intelligentsia opposed Garveyism, in part
because of a middle-class commitment to a policy of civil rights inclusionism within the
American multiracial polity.
142. By way of contrast, Malcolm X, a black leader not of the formally educated black
middle class, embraced a type of internationalism grounded largely in theological notions of
Pan-Islamic universality and shared religious conviction. See Malcolm X, Letter From Abroad,
Jedda, Saudi Arabia (Apr. 20, 1964), in MALCOM X SPEAKS 59, 59 (George Breitman ed.,
1990). This religious orientation distinguishes Malcolm X's internationalism from more main-
stream black internationalist impulses, including Garveyism and Pan-African solidarity. It is
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the black intellectual caste to identify the relevant international
problematics that ostensibly impact their communities and to develop
appropriate responsive strategies.'43 This class orientation largely defined
initial African-American opposition to apartheid, and remains true in the
more recent international Bananas war dispute, and therein lies an
important historical rub. Traditional expressions of African-American
political activism (including black internationalism), although wed to a
top-to-bottom model of engagement has historically derived support
from both middle-class and working-class blacks. The strength of the
civil rights era social protest marches and voter registration initiatives for
example, lay in their ability to unite blacks across class lines. As
discussed more fully below, this traditional model of engagement and
mobilization has failed to provide a long-term impetus for an intra-class
black internationalism, or to serve the deeper economic interests of
working-class blacks more generally. Moreover, it seems that the almost
callous disregard that black internationalism has shown toward the plight
of those African-Americans accurately described as the "truly
disadvantaged" has rendered it functionally irrelevant to twenty-first
century black American life.
In acknowledging this largely class-driven disjuncture, Julian Bond,
the Chairperson of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People (NAACP) recently challenged the NAACP faithful to
embrace a new platform of intra-class inclusionism.'" In large part this
institutional about-face owes to the failure of black leadership to link
global problematics to core black economic and political interests at
home, a move that would almost certainly garner wider support for black
institutional initiatives from working-class blacks. 145 On programmatic
perhaps worth noting that Malcolm X's Pan-Islamic internationalism was itself an outgrowth
of a more radical black nationalism that largely defined the practice of Islam in black America.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address the relative merits of an economics-based
black internationalism as juxtaposed against a black internationalism embracing a more Pan-
African or Pan-global ethos. While I make some attempt to frame the basic contours of such a
debate in this Article, the deeper contours of this debate must fall to another time and place.
143. In this context, see Du Bois, supra note 78, at 384-403 (castigating the black intel-
ligentsia for its relative ignorance of African history and of the historical failure of blacks in
this country to maintain social, political, cultural, and economic ties with the African conti-
nent). African-American internationalism also includes early Back to Africa initiatives under
the auspices of the so-called Free African societies. See id. at 385. Du Bois noted that early
black leaders and their white contemporaries, including President Abraham Lincoln, consid-
ered the relative merits of a large-scale repatriation of blacks to the West Indies and South
America as a way to resolve the race question in America. Id. at 389.
144. See also ROBINSON, supra note 88 (appealing to an intra-class model of collective
black action to cure the social pathologies that continue to afflict the poorest black communi-
ties).
145. See generally Gott, supra note 8.
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grounds, the poorest African-Americans'46 have every right to ask: what
material interest did we have in opposing South African apartheid? How
do banana import and export policies affect black lives today, if at all?
Why should we express concern over the global expansion of multina-
tional corporations? How do these developments impact black lives?
These are legitimate questions that an effective model of black interna-
tionalism must address, but cannot given its current ideological and
structural limitations.
The result is a model of black internationalism that appears
surprisingly piecemeal and reactionary. Piecemeal because it lacks a
coherent set of motivational and organizational principles to guide it.'47
Reactionary because black internationalism has typically defined its core
objectives around high-profile causes like the FSAM, the forceful
repatriation of Haitian refugees seeking peaceful domicile in this
country, or the legality of the Gulf War, but without considering the long-
term implications of these events as they relate to core black political
and economic interests.' 8 Indeed, given the interrelated nature of global
economic, social, and political developments over the past twenty years,
a piecemeal and reactionary black internationalism seems unlikely to
effectively promote deeper political and economic group interests, or to
provide a convincing rationale for more radical, informed models of
engagement and mobilization.
Ironically, to understand the latent potential of an economics-based,
black internationalism to generate widespread working-class interest in,
and to garner financial backing for such a global endeavor, one must
look not to the future, but to the past. It fell to the controversial and still
debated efforts of influential Marcus Garvey (1887-1940), born in
Jamaica,'49 and the UNIA, to reveal the theretofore untapped potential of
an economically grounded black internationalism to promote radical
economic and institutional reform in the name of black progress. 50
Garvey arrived in the United States on March 23, 1916, ostensibly to
promote his "program of race improvement," but later to advance a strat-
egy of racial redemption and group empowerment under the auspices of
the UNIA.''
146. Professor William Julius Wilson has referred to this segment of the black commu-
nity as the black "underclass," denoting that group's marginal economic position, and its
growing isolation from the political, social, and cultural mainstream of American society,
including black middle-class America. See generally WILSON, supra note 24.
147. See generally MARABLE, supra note 39.
148. Cf MARABLE, supra note 39, at 190. But see Gassama, supra note 8, at 157.
149. See CRONON, supra note 75, at 4-7.
150. See Gassama, supra note 8, at 155.
151. See CRONON, supra note 75, at 21-38.
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Garvey remains perhaps best known for advocating a radical but
largely ill-conceived plan to create a Pan-African commercial trade and
manufacturing network that would empower people of color around the
globe. A corollary goal was to repatriate to Africa a select group of in-
dustrious blacks that would create a progressive modern State, thereby
redeeming the image of black people throughout the world.'52 This idea,
conceptualized by Garvey, and promoted under the auspices of the Black
Star Line (BSL) shipping company, unofficially became perhaps the
most visible and concrete expression of Garvey's then radical interna-
tionalism.' 3 The movement drew substantial support from working-class
blacks at the time. Indeed, the impressive support the BSL garnered from
working-class blacks stemmed directly from the ability of the BSL to
appeal to black economic interests. Thus, Garvey's Pan-Africanism
stands apart from more contemporary African-American expressions of
Pan-Africanism because the former provided a conceptual platform
grounded in economic considerations that spoke to the economic expec-
tations of its adherents.
Briefly stated, the BSL sold shares of common stock to its investors,
idealistic African-Americans who believed and invested in Garvey's vi-
sion of creating a global Pan-African economic, social, and political base
via a global trade network.51 4 Garvey's plan involved the purchase of a
small fleet of seaworthy vessels that would create a vast shipping net-
work that would link Africa, the United States, the Caribbean, and Latin
America in a global trade network."' The fleet would also transport the
"faithful" and much-needed supplies back to the "motherland."''5 6 Unfor-
tunately, Garvey's plan drew the disfavor of the District Attorney of New
York'57 and of influential black leaders like W.E.B. Du Bois, both of
whom accused Garvey and his BSL of engaging in fraudulent investment
152. See id. at 77-78.
153. The Black Star Line (BSL) was incorporated in Delaware on July 27, 1919. Garvey
boasted that the BSL would obtain commercial ships to trade "to all parts of the world. The
corporation will offer employment to thousands of our men and women." See DAVID LEVER-
ING LEWIS, W.E.B. Du Bois: THE FIGHT FOR EQUALITY AND THE AMERICAN CENTURY,
1919-1963, at 61 (2000).
154. See TONY MARTIN, MARCUS GARVEY, HERO: A FIRST BIOGRAPHY 55-56 (1983).
155. See LEWIS, supra note 153, at 61.
156. To the surprise of many, Garvey's first ship, the Yarmouth, actually made two voy-
ages to Central America and the West Indies. See CRONON, supra note 75, at 81-84. Moreover,
according to historian David Levering Lewis, "[t]he anchoring of the old Canadian ship Yar-
mouth at 135th Street pier on September 14, 1919, was received by five thousand jostling,
cheering Harlemites as one of the greatest events in the modem history of the Negro race."
LEwis, supra note 153, at 61-62.
157. See CRONON, supra note 75, at 53 (noting the widening scope of the New York Dis-
trict Attorney's investigation into allegations that the Black Star Line venture was riddled with
financial improprieties).
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practices.'58 Moreover, at that time Du Bois himself was committed to a
policy of civil rights inclusionism within the American multiracial polity,
and therefore found Garvey's strategy objectionable on ideological
grounds. According to Du Bois, African-Americans, although admittedly
desperate for a feasible strategy of empowerment, could not rely on the
empty promises of Garveyism, which Du Bois characterized as "mere
rhodomontade [sic] and fatuous propaganda."'5 9 Du Bois's criticism was
grounded in his belief that Garveyism appealed fundamentally to a naYve
and unsophisticated black escapism, one that eschewed realistic empow-
erment strategies in favor of counterproductive empowerment platforms
rooted in a largely uninformed, economically grounded Pan-
Africanism.'6
Du Bois's critique of Garveyism revealed a deep seated bias against
what the former perceived to be black working-class preoccupation with
material and commercial pursuits, and general cultural excess. 6 ' Accord-
ing to Du Bois, the black intelligentsia began to lose touch with its
earlier internationalist impulses owing largely to what he termed the
emergence of a new "Negro bourgeoisie." Representative of this shift
was the emergence of a commercially oriented internationalism repre-
sented by the thinking of men like Marcus Garvey, a leader of some
influence, but whom Du Bois denigrated as "sincere but uneducated and
demagogic."'
62
Despite its flaws (failure to disclose to investors the risks of the ven-
ture, inaccurate tracking of expenses, and the purchase of vessels of
questionable integrity, for example), the BSL initiative demonstrated the
latent potential of an economically driven black internationalism to mo-
bilize widespread black financial support in a way that no other model of
black internationalism has, either before or after. Several important fea-
tures of the BSL initiative stand out. First, unlike either the FSAM or the
158. See LEWIS, supra note 153, at 62.
159. W.E.B. Du Bois, On Being Ashamed of Oneself, in W.E.B. Du Bois: A READER,
supra note 43, at 11-16.
160. Importantly, Du Bois's ideological rival, Booker T. Washington, a black leader who
always enjoyed greater support among so-called working-class blacks, generally downplayed
the significance of black internationalism as a component of group empowerment. This stance
largely owed to Washington's belief that internationalism had no readily cognizable practical
dimension around which working-class blacks could mobilize. See Richardson, supra note 41,
at 61.
161. See Du Bois, supra note 78, at 401 (describing Garvey as "the sincere but unedu-
cated and demagogic West Indian leader ... [who] promoted an African movement, but it was
purely commercial and based on no conception of African history or needs.") Garvey ex-
pressed the same disdain toward Du Bois and his followers that the latter expressed toward the
former. According to Garvey, "Du Bois represented the antebellum Negro whose time was fast
running out." LEWIS, supra note 153, at 63.
162. See Du Bois, supra note 78, at 390, 401.
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Transafrica Coalition's opposition to the USTR banana tariff challenge,
the BSL initiative enjoyed the support of an institutional base created
specifically to support the initiative's goals.'63 While it is true that promi-
nent institutions like churches and civil rights organizations supported
the FSAM, their underlying organizational function was not to promote
black interests via a program of global black economic empowerment.
For these institutions, the FSAM merely provided another opportunity to
participate in the latest high profile social protest movement. The BSL
on the other hand, was specifically created to support and promote a par-
ticularly aggressive iteration of black internationalism, one whose
ideological foundations rested on the twin pillars of black commercial
and institutional development.
Second, although Garvey himself espoused an underlying Pan-
African philosophy not unlike that embraced by Professor Richardson,
64
Garvey's particular Pan-Africanism was expressly linked to a strategy of
economic (and institutional) empowerment for people of black descent.
In this sense, the Pan-Africanism that underscored the BSL initiative
differed radically from that which underscored both the domestic FSAM
and the efforts of the Transafrica Coalition to avert a disastrous trade war
between the United States and the EU over preferential banana tariff
subsidies. Neither the Transafrica Coalition, nor the domestic FSAM
leadership made any direct appeals to specific black socioeconomic in-
terests in their efforts to mobilize large-scale black opposition to these
perceived global wrongs. This oversight severely hindered the ability of
these initiatives to propose more radical strategies of black empower-
ment.
In terms of class, the BSL movement drew its support primarily
from working-class blacks (although middle-class blacks were not pre-
cluded from participating). The BSL and Garvey's innate appeal rested
in large part on their willingness to convey to the rank and file a message
of economic populism. Unfortunately, the practical value of a black in-
ternationalism driven largely by economic considerations seems to have
escaped the imaginations of today's critical race globalists, both scholars
and activists. By and large, they have not attempted to appeal directly to
the socioeconomic interests of their constituents. For example, in advo-
cating a merger of radical race theory and practice by embracing a global
outlook, Professor Gassama appears wholly oblivious to the all-
important economic question. According to Gassama, "[i]t appears that
163. See CRONON, supra note 75, at 51 (noting that for its time, the Black Star Line rep-
resented a "supremely audacious" organizational venture, one uniquely attuned to the
perceived and actual needs of the organization's largely working-class constituency).
164. See Richardson, supra note 41.
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no one has discovered a more effective way than rights to successfully
mobilize large numbers of people to give their all to a struggle for jus-
tice." '65 This is simply not true.
This is not to suggest that either Garvey or the BSL was immune to
some well-deserved criticism regarding questionable business practices.
The purported financial mismanagement of the BSL by Garvey and his
associates led to two noted criminal trials in the New York federal
courts.'6 6 During trial, Garvey fired his African-American attorney, and
proceeded to represent himself.'67 Garvey was arrested at least once for
selling stocks illegally in support of the BSL venture.' 68 In short, while
ambitious in scope and successful in its ability to draw support from the
black masses, the BSL initiative was an utter disaster financially and or-
ganizationally. However, the very failure of the BSL has, from a
historical perspective, profound implications for modern political
lawyering practice. First, the very existence of the BSL and widespread
black middle-class opposition to that venture suggests a deep cleavage
between the black masses and that same black middle class, a cleavage
that has only deepened in the intervening years. Second, the BSL venture
reveals a fact that African-Americans do not generally like to discuss
outside of the group, but which must be recognized in the Garvey-BSL
context. Namely, the unfortunate inability of working-class and middle-
class blacks to collaborate successfully on matters of shared interest.
69
The intense animus between the Garveyites and the followers of Du Bois
painfully bears out this observation.
Of course, the failure of contemporary black internationalists to link
Garvey's largely successful mobilization formula to a more progressive,
coherent ideological and institutional platform raises important ques-
tions. Why have black internationalists not attempted to replicate
Garvey's economic progressivism to a modified and more coherent strat-
egy? How has the denunciation of the positive elements of Garveyism
affected U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and the Caribbean in the in-
tervening years? Part III will present an attempt to answer these
questions.
In assessing the unique characteristics of the emerging world eco-
nomic order, and in identifying the unique implications suggested
thereby, Part I posited that the core challenges of globalization for black
165. See Gassama, supra note 8, at 155.
166. See Garvey v. United States, 4 F2d 974 (2d Cir. 1925).
167. See CRONON, supra note 75, at 113.
168. See id. at 76.
169. See CRUSE, supra note 83, at 258-59 (arguing that the failure of the Harlem Renais-
sance to fulfill its burgeoning promise of black spiritual, economic, and cultural empowerment
owed to the failure of the black middle class to support these objectives).
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Americans were those that implicated black economic interests. In light
of this conclusion, Part I recommended that black internationalism em-
brace an alternative empowerment platform, one that emphasized black
economic development and institutional capacity building. 170 Part I con-
cluded by stating that a realignment of black internationalism along an
economically grounded axis would serve to energize more traditional
modalities of black empowerment both domestically and globally.
This particular strategic shift was made all the more apparent by an
historical evaluation of black internationalism. Part II revealed that black
internationalism as an instrument of empowerment could be rendered
more effective by embracing an economically grounded approach.
However, the FSAM revealed that black activists and internationalists
have remained largely oblivious to the economic implications that often
underscore transnational racial subordination problematics. Thus, while
black anti-apartheid activists rightly perceived the inherent moral
contradictions of U.S. governmental support for the brutal minority-led
South African regime, those same activists did not appear to appreciate
the adverse impact U.S. governmental and corporate policies favoring
that regime had on black labor viability.'7' In other words, black
America's collective preoccupation with securing nonsubstantive racial
justice for black South Africans during the FSAM diverted and arguably
undermined efforts to secure a form of substantive racial justice for the
economically and politically subordinated black masses in this country.'72
Recent expressions of black internationalism have only reinforced
the importance of economics as it relates to the question of black
empowerment and to the ability of black institutions to impact U.S.
foreign policy initiatives in a manner consistent with black values and
interests. Part II demonstrated that the adoption of an economics-based
paradigm might actually have bolstered efforts by black activists to alter
the disastrous trajectory of U.S foreign trade policy in the global
Bananas war. That conflict revealed that the current international trade
dispute system, an important feature of the economic globalization,
championed and ultimately afforded legal protection to those parties
with concrete economic interests at stake.'73 Thus, the current system
1,70. See supra Section I.A.
171. See MARABLE, supra note 39, at 190.
172. Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HARv. HUM. RTS. J. 63, 112-14 (1997) (arguing that global activists would have
better served the interests of justice by promoting not just constitutional reform but a program
of substantive, i.e., economic, justice as well).
173. This conclusion is consistent with the conclusions of a growing number of interna-
tional trade scholars who note that the fundamental incompatibility of trade and non-trade
values renders the current international trade system unable to recognize and protect non-trade
values. See generally Dunoff, supra note 10.
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appears to recognize and to give legal cognizance to a rather limited
range of interests. Concerns over equity, social and racial justice cannot
find solace in the existing system because it was not designed to promote
or advance those interests. Part II concluded that by creating a more
concrete body of black economic interests, and by stressing black
institutional capacity building to promote those interests, black activists
would have been better positioned to impact U.S. foreign trade policy
through a strategy of informed activism. This suggests that black
internationalism must, at least within the confines of the global
economic sphere, attempt to expand and strengthen for the benefit of its
constituents the kinds of concrete economic interests that the system
does recognize.
Harkening back to the early decades of the twentieth century, it fell
to the Marcus Garvey-BSL movement to suggest, however incompletely,
the essential elements of an economics-based black internationalism.
Part II argued that the lessons of Garveyism served dual prescriptive
functions. First, Garveyism provided an historical glimpse at how black
internationalism might have developed had black leadership embraced a
platform of economic global empowerment. Second, Garveyism provided
a theoretical platform for a forward-looking black internationalism. Al-
though largely unpopular amongst the black intelligentsia,' 74 plagued by
an overly-romantic and largely unrealistic "Back to Africa" ideology,
and cursed with a regrettable inattention to important financial, organiza-
tional, and legal details, Garvey's particular brand of black
internationalism nevertheless succeeded where later attempts failed,
namely in its ability to attract the financial and ideological support of the
black working class in large numbers. "
It was through the still-controversial BSL, with its emphasis on the
primacy of economic self-reliance through the creation of black institu-
tions and businesses as a means of achieving group empowerment that
the first two elements of an economically grounded black international-
ism would emerge. 76 These include a program of black economic
174. See generally Du Bois, supra note 78.
175. It perhaps says something about the implicit radical potential for change the BSL
represented, that neither the federal government nor the individual states could muster the
political will to pass legislation or take concrete steps to end the lynching of blacks in the Jim
Crow south. It is ironic, then, that something as ostensibly nonthreatening as a black commer-
cial venture targeted at blacks exclusively would draw the attention of the New York District
Attorney's office. For a provocative analysis of the Garvey movement, see CRUSE, supra note
83, at 115-46.
176. See MARTIN, supra note 154, at 50-53 (identifying the three core elements of
Garvey's philosophy of group empowerment). These core elements included the promotion of
group interests through the creation of (I) independent black institutions; (2) a philosophy of
black self-reliance; and finally (3) black nationhood. This third element referred to the per-
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empowerment coupled with a companion strategy of institutional capac-
ity building. A third element of an economically grounded black
internationalism is suggested by the very nature of the global economy
and its attendant and still emerging legal substructure, referred to as the
need to influence domestic and international free trade initiatives
through a policy of proactive black participation in the political process.
Simply put, an economics-based black internationalism would, at a
minimum, stress the following features: black economic development;
institutional capacity building; and a program of informed legislative and
foreign policy advocacy.
The goal in the next Part is to sketch a broad theoretical framework
for an economically grounded black internationalism. In articulating a
realignment of black internationalism along an overtly economic axis,
this Article aims to engender livelier debate among black international-
ists, critical race theorists, and international law experts regarding the
perceived strengths and weaknesses of this approach. '
III. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF AN ECONOMICALLY
GROUNDED BLACK INTERNATIONALISM
A. Economic Empowerment
As argued above, the failure of black internationalism to alter or
even impact significantly the trajectory of the Bananas war owed to the
inability of black internationalists conceptually to de-couple the eco-
nomic and moral imperatives that underscored that conflict. As discussed
previously, that dispute involved the intersection of competing economic
interests, whether American, Caribbean, European, Latin American, or
ceived need to create an independent and economically viable black homeland, preferably in
Africa. Id. This Article ignores the last element of Garvey's empowerment philosophy because
the idea of creating an independent and economically viable black homeland no longer has
widespread currency among most black Americans. Additionally and perhaps more impor-
tantly, such an initiative is no longer politically or economically feasible, especially within the
framework of a more democratic and multiethnic American polity, one wherein blacks do have
a real social, cultural, and economic stake. Despite these barriers to the creation of an inde-
pendent and economically viable black homeland, the idea continues to ignite the imagination
of the black intelligentsia. See generally Kevin Hopkins, Back to Afrolantica: A Legacy of
(Black) Perseverance?, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 447 (1998) (arguing that the
"Back to Africa" ideal still has currency as an emblem of black spiritual perseverance and
creativity in the face of racial subordination and discrimination).
177. It is not my intent to predict all of the theoretical implications raised by such a reas-
sessment. Rather, the goal of this Article is to identify certain ideological tensions that
historically have impeded the adoption of an economically driven black global empowerment
strategy, and to suggest a way out of this seemingly strategically limited, largely unproductive
end game.
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corporate. Lacking a demonstrable economic platform from which to
pursue concrete black interests, domestic black intervention in the dis-
pute had to be bootstrapped to concerns like a feared increase in illicit
drug production, 7 1 or to more general condemnations of the perceived
brutality of the USTR's challenge. 79 More precisely, the failure of black
internationalism to engender any significant impact in the Bananas war
owed to the deeper historic failure of the former to embrace and outline a
functional platform of black economic empowerment that would address
the economic tensions that globalization purportedly reinforces.8 In as-
sessing this failure, two central problematics emerge, each connected to
the other historically and ideologically.
First is the inability of a black internationalism that remains linked
ideologically to the ideals of Pan-African solidarity to grasp and respond
to the short-term economic dislocations such as the loss of jobs in the
black community caused by capital migrations to developing countries.
Professor Manning Marable has expressed similar concerns by stressing
that the failure of the FSAM to incorporate a platform of economic em-
178. See Williams, supra note 79, at 180.
179. See Gassama, supra note 8, at 155-58. In addition, the failure of the Transafrica
Coalition also owed to the limited number of foci present in international trade dispute
mechanisms. Thus, considerations of increased drug production or underlying questions of
equity and fairness simply lay beyond the limited scope of the WTO's trade dispute resolution
mindate. Recent scholarship provides at least partial explanation for the inability of the inter-
national trade system to resolve these kinds of issues and tensions. First, there is a growing
belief that global trade policy must embrace market principles only and remain separate and
distinct from local, social, cultural, and political concerns and structures. Second, trade global-
ists view the sovereign State as the proper arena for these local, social, cultural, and political
concerns and structures, not the realm of international economic politics.
In response to these trends, some international trade scholars have embraced the idea of
"linking" international trade problematics with labor, environmental, and other non-trade
issues. In essence, "linkage issue" advocates seek to correct what they perceive as imbalances
in the global trade system by expanding the range of values considered by international trade
regimes. Professor Jeffrey Dunoff, a leading "linkage issue" scholar, observes that an institu-
tional danger exists which undermines the notion that local (and by extension black) interests
should be promoted and defended at the global level. Dunoff remains unconvinced about the
prospects of forging effective linkages that seek to address environmental, labor, and other
non-trade concerns because trade experts often lack the necessary expertise to make such
linkages work. Instead, Dunoff suggests that "international trade scholars ... discontinue their
attempts to fashion a new model; instead they ought to identify the strengths and weaknesses
of the various models available, and pull from each of these models insights that can help
illuminate the difficult challenges posed by the linkage issues." Dunoff, supra note 10, at 386,
377-89. Dunoff concludes by urging a synthesis of economics, political science, and legal
scholarship as a possible way out of the dilemma he describes as a paradox of the limitations
of WTO jurisprudence in the face of increasing demands for reform. See id.
180. Ironically, an essential objective of Garvey's Black Star Line was the creation of an
extensive trade network linking Afican-American economic interests with those of blacks in
the Caribbean and Africa. One can only speculate on the potential for black internationalism
to impact on disputes like the Bananas war had the Black Star Line initiative met with even
modest success.
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powerment seriously undermined the innate radical potential of black
internationalism.' 8' The domestic FSAM did not address the migration of
black jobs to South Africa, a migration encouraged by the minority-led
South African government's policy of racially-based wage suppression,
because the FSAM never identified as a viable policy goal the economic
empowerment of blacks in this country. A primary function of an eco-
nomically grounded paradigm, then, must be to identify the ways in
which globalization undermines in the short term the loss of jobs in this
country through capital outflows to other parts of the world, and to de-
velop strategies responsive to these developments.
Second, the inability of black internationalism to embrace an eco-
nomically grounded paradigm owes to lingering confusion within the
black community over the distinction between economic and institu-
tional empowerment on the one hand, and the domestic struggle for civil
rights on the other.' 82 A number of commentators have echoed this obser-
vation. Professor Harold Cruse has suggested that black institutions like
the NAACP have eschewed an economic program of group empower-
ment in favor of a program extolling the universal virtues of civil rights
empowerment. 83 Cruse attributes this failure to deep and historically
rooted contradictions within the civil rights-black empowerment move-
ment. Cruse notes: "[t]he real internal difficulty was the [Afro-American
League's] inability to argue out a functional consensus among the deeply
divided intraracial ideals related to the fulfillment of black citizenship in
American democracy. How to secure and maintain progressive black
public school education was only one of a number of conflictual pro-
grammatic issues the league had to contend with."' 84
This inability of black leadership generally, and black international-
ism more specifically, to promulgate a coherent platform of economic
empowerment stems in large part from the black community's deep am-
bivalence over its precise role in American economic life. Nowhere is
this ambivalence more apparent than on the so-called "globalization
question." For example, in recent months, Congressman Jesse Jackson,
Jr. has become an outspoken critic of the newly enacted AGOA. He has
argued that multinational corporations will emerge as the primary bene-
ficiaries of a trade regime that does not differ in principle from the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a regional trade agreement
181. See MARABLE, supra note 39, at 189-96.
182. See generally Gary Chartier, Civil Rights and Economic Democracy, 40 WASHBURN
L.J. 267 (2001) (arguing, incorrectly in my opinion, that the black civil rights struggle in the
United States always reflected an underlying commitment to black economic empowerment).
183. See CRUSE, supra note 26, at 370-91.
184. See id. at 11.
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that has faced similar criticism because it purportedly stresses the de-
mands of investor capital but ignores social justice considerations. 5
At the same time, Jesse Jackson, Jr. and the Reverend Jesse Jackson,
Sr., have championed the cause of black corporate employees seeking
greater access into the upper echelons of the largely white-dominated
corporate power structure. '6 Ironically, these same corporations remain
the strongest supporters of the free trade goals embodied in international
agreements like NAFTA and the African Trade Bill-goals that Jesse
Jackson, Jr. apparently opposes, at least to some degree. The Jacksons'
positions illustrate the degree to which black leadership and black
America in general remain deeply divided over the question of black
economic participation in this country.
Importantly, it is not at all clear that calls for greater black participa-
tion in corporate governance are actually premised on the belief that
black managers as opposed to white ones will run multinational corpora-
tions any differently, or with any greater circumspection toward the
mandates of global free trade. To the contrary, the assumption here
seems to be that qualified blacks can run America's corporations as ef-
fectively as their white counterparts, subject to the same domestic and
international rules of the game. Thus, blacks remain overwhelmingly
committed to the notion that individual economic progress largely de-
pends on one's acceptance of the general principles of capitalism'87 as
championed by the majority political and corporate establishment.
This suggests that the black middle class in particular remains wed
to the idea that economic advancement is still largely a function of how
successfully one is able to navigate the treacherous currents of corporate
American life. Black middle-class economic dependence on corporate
America then, renders these same blacks unable and unwilling to reflect
critically on the advantages and disadvantages of black allegiance to this
system, even as poor blacks overlooked by the system remain free to
pursue more radical political options.
Ironically, when black internationalists like W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul
Robeson criticized and largely rejected the U.S. neoliberal economic
ideology in favor of a more radical form of international socialism,'
8
they found themselves ostracized not only by white America, but also by
185. See, e.g., Alvarez, supra note 9, at 307-10.
186. The Reverend Jesse Jackson, Sr. has been criticized by conservative groups recently
for apparently accepting large contributions for his "Operation: Push" organization in return
for his agreeing to end protests aimed at addressing black concerns over perceived discrimina-
tory treatment by these same corporate actors.
187. See CRUSE, supra note 26, at 391.
188. See Du Bois, supra note 43, at 338-40 (criticizing prevailing socialist discourse of
the early twentieth century for downplaying the complexities of race and labor in the Ameri-
can context).
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a significant number of blacks as well. This unwillingness to assess
critically the strengths and weaknesses of America's unwavering
adherence to a neoliberal economic ideology renders black America
incapable of reaching any internal consensus on the precise role that
black Americans should play in the domestic and global economies.
Thus, at a more fundamental level, an economically grounded black
internationalism must attempt to outline a more coherent strategy of
black economic empowerment. It also must try to reconcile an ongoing
and deeply rooted black ambivalence to the imperatives of capitalism
and economic globalization by developing an independent critical
ideology, one that can pragmatically assess the strengths and weaknesses
of the extant economic system and craft strategies responsive to the
material needs of all African-Americans.
Recent attempts to develop a black economic empowerment frame-
work suggest an awareness of this crucial aspect of a more
comprehensive black empowerment program. For example, Lateef
Mtima has suggested that African-American economic empowerment
strategies might be better directed toward providing white employers
with "new incentives to abandon the discriminatory choices or practices
that result from these racially reflexive feelings .... The objective
should be to reduce or eliminate the discriminatory impacts of these feel-
ings [of racial prejudice against black workers]9" More recently, David
Dante Troutt has proposed an economic empowerment strategy that em-
ploys consumer protection mandates as a means of mitigating the
destabilizing impact of irrational consumption practices among poor
blacks.' 90
Notable as these efforts are, however, they remain limited in their
potential vis- -vis economic globalization because they view the black
economy as requiring only external empowerment assistance. By way of
contrast, an economically grounded black internationalism advocates an
internal black response consonant with the legal and economic mandates
of globalization. Given the historic disjuncture between the traditionally
limited foci of black internationalism and the precarious economic status
of most working-class blacks,' 9' such an approach seems both timely and
recommended.
189. Mtima, supra note 25, at 419.
190. See generally Troutt, supra note 25 (recognizing the consumption of goods and ser-
vices as a central feature of our economic system, and suggesting that consumer protection
laws might be revised to help mitigate the debilitating effects of conspicuous and irrational
inner-city consumption practices).
191. See generally supra notes 20-25.
Summer 2002]
Michigan Journal of International Law
B. Policy and Legislative Advocacy
At a very fundamental level, when critics reference the globalization
process, 92 they are also implicating the international legal system itself,
whether inadvertently or not.' 93 This is because globalization also refers
to the attendant international legal regimes that profoundly influence
multinational corporate behavior. 94 When viewed in this light, it be-
comes apparent that criticisms of the perceived increased power of
multinational corporations in the global arena, to cite one example, in
part place the blame at the wrong source. These corporations have not
usurped the power they are often accused of abusing in some illegitimate
or insidious fashion. Rather, they have acquired this influence with the
assistance and ostensible approval of various State actors.' 95 In other
words, States themselves, and the western industrialized democracies in
particular, have made possible via structural economic adjustments and
global legal initiatives, the very events that have raised concerns for so
many critics. This subtle but nevertheless important distinction has pro-
found theoretical and pragmatic implications for the proponents of
community-based empowerment initiatives.
First, this distinction suggests that local capacity building (black in-
stitutional capacity building) should not be viewed solely as a strategy to
192. See Lusane, supra note 47, at 434-36 (noting that the gap between the poorest and
wealthiest blacks has widened during the most recent economic expansionary period).
193. See Joel P. Trachtman, The International Economic Law Revolution, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 33 (1996) (arguing that international lawyers should de-emphasize the distinc-
tion between international public law and international economic law); see also Jackson,
supra note 5, at 597 (arguing that no justifiable distinction should be made between interna-
tional economic law and public international law). Professor Trachtman notes that ongoing
economic integration provides perhaps the most powerful impetus for new public international
law developments. See Trachtman, supra, at 597.
194. See Alvarez, supra note 9, at 304-05 (arguing that NAFTA has produced a rule-
based system of international trade governance that emphasizes predictability of outcome to
the benefit of multinational corporations, and to the detriment of workers).
195. But see Ralph Nader & Lori Wallach, GATT NAFTA, and the Subversion of the
Democratic Process, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN To-
WARD THE LOCAL 92, 99-101 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996). Former Green
Party Presidential candidate and long-time consumer safety advocate Ralph Nader, an outspo-
ken critic of NAFTA, has suggested that this characterization is not entirely accurate. He
argues that the United States, Canadian, and Mexican legislatures that signed NAFTA did so
absent a full appreciation of its far-reaching and often antidemocratic tendencies. In this sense
then, multinational corporations received a kind of legislative windfall through the passage of
NAFTA, albeit without the actual approval of the relevant State actors because the latter's
consent to be bound to that agreement was largely uninformed. This observation, while per-
ceptive, does not undercut the observation that increased freedom of corporate action through
more liberal rules governing capital mobility involved deliberate State action, if not actual
approval under Nader's more literal formulation of sovereign intent. Professor Alvarez argues
that the agreement is not even a treaty between "sovereign equals" because "[tihere is no ac-
tual symmetry of direct benefits to the national investors of all three NAFTA parties-at least
not for the foreseeable future." Alvarez, supra note 9, at 304.
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counter the perceived economic and political dominance of multinational
corporations. Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest the ultimate
futility of such efforts, given the size and extensive financial power of
these corporate Goliaths."96 Rather, this interpretation suggests that its
proponents view localism' 97 as both a legal and political model of collec-
tive action that, when deployed effectively, has the potential to influence
both sovereign State adherence to international law, and how sovereign
States identify and pursue foreign policy objectives that impact margin-
alized groups. In this sense, Professor Schacter hit the proverbial "nail
on the head" when he recognized the continuing importance of sovereign
States as the only legal entities that can effectively regulate global eco-
nomic and political affairs.'98
When viewed in this more legalistic light, the perceived corporate
excesses about which some critics of globalization complain appear less
objectionable. Given the favorable legal environment in which multina-
tional corporations operate,' 99 one can plausibly characterize their
behavior as indicative of deliberate and rational choice.2m In other words,
when one conceives of this issue in purely economic terms, efficiency
196. See CARL BoGGs, THE END OF POLITICS: CORPORATE POWER AND THE DECLINE OF
THE PUBLIC SPHERE 213 (2000) (arguing that community-based empowerment strategies will
likely prove ineffective in countering the overwhelming power of multinational corporations).
197. Localism has emerged in recent years as a central strategic model for both interna-
tional trade and poverty law scholars. Unlike critical race globalism, with its ostensible
preoccupation with macro-level questions of race, class, gender, and nationalism in the global
context, localism focuses on micro-level organizational problematics and specific institutional
dynamics. The proponents of localism advocate the creation of local institutions that can redirect
political and economic control back to the local level. Poverty law scholars use the phrase "law
and organizing" to describe their community-based approach to effecting social change through
political lawyering practice. See generally Scott L. Cummings & Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Re-
flection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443 (2001). The law and organizing
movement encompasses a broad range of perspectives and approaches. Hence, it would be inac-
curate to suggest that a comprehensive and unified law and organizing movement has actually
emerged. International trade scholars sometimes deploy the term "relocalization" to describe
their strategy of local empowerment to counter the dislocating effects of globalization. See gen-
erally THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN TOWARD THE LOCAL, supra
note 195. Importantly, both poverty law scholars and international trade scholars advocate strate-
gic organizational alliances to effectively counter the immense power and influence of
multinational corporations and international trade regimes like NAFTA.
198. See Oscar Schacter, The Erosion of State Authority and Its Implications for Equitable
Development, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW WITH A HUMAN FACE 31, 31-44 (Friedl Weiss
et al. eds., 1998).
199. See Alvarez, supra note 9, at 309-10 (arguing that the tendency to view multinational
corporations as natural persons and to extend to them all of the rights and privileges, but not the
obligations commensurate with that status, has merely increased the power and disproportionate
influence they now enjoy). I would counter that if we actually treat corporations as natural per-
sons, then we should expect them to act accordingly in the marketplace, and to pursue their own
economic advantage as persons given prevailing political and legal realities.
200. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
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suggests that it is desirable to move production offshore if doing so
avoids the higher overhead typically associated with higher labor costs
and compliance with environmental and other regulations. All of which
brings us to the third point, namely, that a primary aim of an economics-
based black internationalism should be to influence and shape public
policy decisions at the national level, that is, mobilizing constituencies at
the local level. This is especially true in the case of regional and global
trade agreements that potentially impact the viability of black jobs in
major industrial centers. Such activism will ensure that the correct mix
of legal and economic incentives and disincentives exists in order to ef-
fectively influence corporate behavior.0 ' Indeed, it is potentially
counterproductive to view globalization as a phenomenon separate and
distinct from national foreign policy agendas. Such an interpretation runs
the risk of removing global economic developments from the precise
legal and global political environments in which they operate.
The danger lies not in corporate excess per se, but in allowing a
domestic foreign policy platform which champions unrestrained
corporate expansion as a central U.S. foreign policy objective to proceed
unchallenged. 22 Historically, U.S. foreign trade policy formulation and
implementation has taken the form of bilateral trade initiatives of rather
limited scope,"0 3 comprehensive trade restrictive tariffs and related
barriers, °' and informal State Department, Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, or Congressional intervention on behalf of U.S.
multinational firms doing business in foreign States. Indeed, the image
of Congressional or State Department intervention in Latin America on
behalf of the Doles and Chiquitas of the world 205 may strike modem trade
scholars as anachronistic in its relative informality and reliance on ad
hoc, versus more formalized, dispute resolution mechanics, but it is
201. See generally Kenneth W. Abbott, "Economic" Issues and Political Participation:
The Evolving Boundaries of International Federalism, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 971 (1996) (argu-
ing in favor of a series of modest proposals to increase public participation in the U.S. foreign
trade policy formulation context); see also PETER KATZENSTEIN, SMALL STATES IN WORLD
MARKETS 87-94, 139-49, 199-204 (1985) (arguing that community-based institutions have a
better chance influencing local policymakers than they do influencing national or international
ones).
202. See Carrasco, supra note 12, at 317 (promoting a pro-capitalist critical race agenda
that eschews alternative models of political-economic organization).
203. See generally Free Trade Agreement, Can.-U.S., 27 I.L.M. 281 (Jan. 2, 1988).
204. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1304 (1930), is a good example
of the type of formal trade-restrictive measures typical of earlier U.S. trade policy.
205. 1 have in mind here calls by American multinational corporations operating in Chile
during the Cold War to Congress, appealing for deliberate action to be taken in order to protect
U.S. corporate interests in the face of calls to overhaul Chile's feudal property ownership laws
by the democratically elected but socialist-leaning president, Salvador Allende. Allende was
eventually overthrown in a violent coup orchestrated by Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet
with the support of the United States.
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certainly not untrue. This older process has been criticized as
"inexpedient and unpredictable," 206 referring to both the cumbersome
nature of this particular method of foreign policy implementation, and to
the unpredictable political and economic outcomes that often resulted.
Recently, the capitalist democracies of Western Europe, the United
States, and Canada have largely abandoned ad hoc international trade
governance in favor of a more strictly regulated system that stresses rule
consistency and relative outcome predictability.20 7 Correspondingly, we
have witnessed the wholesale embrace of international trade governance
through regimes like the GATT, the WTO, and NAFTA. On the domestic
front, the United States has followed suit, largely abandoning trade uni-
lateralism and arbitrariness in favor of a rule-oriented system of trade
governance.20 ' For example, responsibility for supervising major United
States trade initiatives, and more importantly foreign trade disputes, has
moved from general State Department oversight to oversight under the
auspices of the United States Trade Representative' 9 In this sense, trade
issues have assumed greater prominence within the larger U.S. foreign
policy framework. Perhaps more importantly, supporters of the current
rule-based system see it as fairer to all participants and more likely to
provide stability and predictability of outcome over older, more inexpe-
dient methods of trade governance.
206. Natalie R. Minter, Fast-Track Procedures: Do They Infringe Upon Congressional
Constitutional Rights?, 1 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y 105, 107 (1995). It is questionable
whether the results of this informal method of foreign trade regulation can actually be deemed
unpredictable. Political scientists have long held that U.S. trade policy in Latin America, was
premised on a deliberate and highly predicable strategy of achieving hemispheric economic
hegemony through direct and indirect military and economic intervention in that region. This
model of foreign trade policy is intimately linked to the larger history of U.S. foreign policy
during the Cold War. Today, it seems almost axiomatic to suggest that the "inexpedient and
unpredictable" nature of Cold War-era foreign policy actually benefited particular corporate
and strategic interests inside the United States in a highly predictable fashion.
207. See Glen T. Schleyer, Power to the People: Allowing Private Parties to Raise
Claims Before the WTO Dispute Resolution System, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2275, 2291 (arguing
that the "increasing emphasis on rule integrity in international trade dispute resolution is a
desirable trend that should continue in the future").
208. However, for an excellent analysis of the lingering dilemmas of cold war foreign
trade policy unilateralism, see James M. Cooper, Spirits in the Material World: A Post-Modern
Approach to United States Trade Policy, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 957, 958 (1999). It has been
suggested that the spate of trade disputes that have arisen in recent years between the United
States and its foreign trading partners indicates a retreat from the principles of free trade mul-
tilateralism on the part of the United States. However, some critics would argue that the
success of free trade multilateralism is not denoted by the absence of trade disputes altogether,
but by the fact that the parties involved have developed and agreed to resolve these disputes in
a special forum, such as the WTO, under rules predetermined and known from the outset.
209. See generally Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301-09, amended by 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-2415
(1988), at § 2411.
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Critics of globalization tell a different story. They decry this shift
toward rule and institutional formalism as a threat to local communities
and local interests.2 They argue that formalized international trade gov-
ernance and dispute resolution ignore or subsume local concerns in favor
of the demands of global investor capital.2 ' The recent and sometimes
violent protests in Seattle, Montreal, and Washington, D.C., challenging
the perceived global hegemony of international trade regimes like the
WTO, demonstrate the apprehension many communities feel in the face
of global economic expansion. The image conjured by free trade oppo-
nents is that of a global trading system dominated by centralized
bureaucracies and transnational corporations largely disengaged from
and unaccountable to the concerns of local communities and their con-
212
stituent political representatives.
It remains paramount then for an economically grounded black in-
ternationalism to promote black interests through an informed and
aggressive legislative agenda, one that seeks to give due recognition to
black economic and other concerns at the national level. This will ensure
at the national level that any particular sovereign foreign policy calculus
incorporate the widest possible considerations of relevant interests, both
213public and corporate.
C. Institutional Capacity Building
The vulnerability of local communities to the adverse impacts of
globalization (job migration, declining labor and environmental stan-
dards, rapidly increasing income inequality) reflects to a large degree,
weaknesses within civil society and the continued political and economic
210. See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Institutional Misfits: The GA77, the ICJ & Trade-
Environment Disputes, 15 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1043 (1994) (discussing the ways in which
GATT promotes corporate and trade interests over noneconomic ones like labor standards and
the environment).
211. See generally Jessica C. Pearlman, Note, Participation By Private Counsel in World
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement Proceedings, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 399, 405-
09 (1999) (discussing the desire by developing countries to use private lawyers in WTO dis-
pute settlements due to the limited resources of these countries).
212. See Adebayo Adedeji, An Alternative for Africa, in ECONOMIC REFORM AND DE-
MOCRACY 126, 127-39 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 1995) (arguing that the
structural reforms proposed by international organizations like the International Monetary
Fund ignore the historical and political realities of many African States).
213. See Jackson, supra note 5, at 595 ("Governments increasingly find it difficult to
implement worthy policies concerning economic activity because such activity often crosses
borders in ways to escape the reach of much of national government control"). This suggests
that governments alone cannot craft legal and policy strategies sufficient to shape the global
economy and to meet the needs of their constituents. It also suggests the importance of healthy
community-based activism in order to define the global economic agenda.
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214marginalization of the poorest Americans. To combat these trends a
growing number of international trade scholars argue that local commu-
nities must rethink their relationships to one another and to the global
economy, and craft strategies that will prove effective in promoting and
protecting local or group interests.215
Relocalization or localism, a term employed by some international
trade scholars,26 stresses the primacy of local initiatives to combat the
adverse effects of globalization. 217 Two underlying substantive features of
relocalization warrant discussion: (1) relocalization proponents stress the
importance of community-based models of action that can effectively
shift political and economic power back to local communities;2 1 8 and
(2) these proponents stress the need to create economics-based coalitions
to mount an effective political challenge to the perceived political and
economic hegemony of multinational corporations, and the perceived
political unaccountability of international trade regimes like NAFTA. A
thorough discussion of coalitional theory falls beyond the immediate
scope of this Article. Instead, the challenges the African-American
community faces internally as it struggles to respond to a world of in-
creasing complexity and global interdependence are addressed below.
For the black community,219 the implications of globalization, and the
effectiveness of strategies designed to combat the loss of jobs and local
economic control, are profound. Recent studies indicate that African-
American economic progress over the past two decades220 has been
tempered by the emergence of a growing and increasingly marginalized
black "underclass," despite an unprecedented period of economic
214. Some commentators have posited the collapse of the sovereign State as the primary
reason for this acceleration. See, e.g., Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF.,
Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50.
215. See generally THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN To-
WARD THE LOCAL, supra note 195.
216. See Helena Norberg-Hodge, Shifting Direction From Global Dependence to Local
Interdependence, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN TOWARD
THE LOCAL, supra note 195, at 393-406 (using the term "localization").
217. See generally William P. Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering
for Empowerment of Community Organizations, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 455 (1994) (advancing
community organizing as an indispensable component of local empowerment efforts).
218. See Taibi, supra note 11, at 977; see also Tim Luke, Community and Ecology, in
THE GRAYWOLF ANNUAL TEN: CHANGING COMMUNITY 207, 214-15 (Scott Walker ed.,
1993), cited in Taibi, supra note 11, at n. 115.
219. My use of the phrase "black community" should not be read to mask the fact that
underclass and middle-class black interests often diverge, and in ways that have proven espe-
cially destructive to the fabric of black social and economic life in postindustrial America.
Indeed, it is a central premise of this Article that black progress in general has been severely
retarded by the inability of black leadership to grasp and effectively manage the class question
in African-American political and economic life.
220. See generally supra notes 20-25.
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expansion during the mid-to-late 1990s. 22' The sharp decline via job
migration in manufacturing jobs in our major urban industrial centers-
long a fertile source of black employment-for example, reveals the
need for blacks to respond strategically to these developments, and
denotes the way in which economic globalization has impacted black
America. The challenge remains to realign black institutions so that they
can better respond to the imperatives of economic globalization and
more effectively meet the needs and expectations of their constituents.
IV. MAKING AN ECONOMICS-BASED BLACK INTERNATIONALISM WORK
The debate surrounding the perceived strengths and weaknesses of
the African Trade Bill (AGOA, or "the Bill")22 recently enacted by
Congress provides an ideal platform through which to assess the
potential effectiveness of an economically grounded black
internationalism. In brief, the AGOA champions a sub-Saharan African
23
economic and political rebirth22 grounded not in reliance on traditional
U.S. foreign aid initiatives, but in the principles of African self-help,
regional free trade, and the implementation of meaningful democratic
reforms. 5 Critical discussions surrounding the AGOA, especially within
the black community, reveal the degree to which that community
221. See Lusane, supra note 47, at 434-36; see also WILSON, supra note 24 (providing
what remains perhaps the most insightful discussion of the growing class divide between
middle-class and working-class blacks in postindustrial America). The inability of blacks to
achieve widespread economic gains during the most recent expansionary period either
suggests possible structural flaws in the American capitalist system, or shortcomings in the
ability of African-American leadership to deliver the economic goods, or perhaps a bit of both.
222. The Trade and Development Act of 2000 (African Trade Bill), 19 U.S.C. §§ 3701-
3741 (2000). The provisions of the African Trade Bill are also collectively referred to as the
African Growth and Opportunity Act [hereinafter AGOA or, alternatively, "the Bill"].
223. The region commonly referred to as sub-Saharan Africa presently consists of forty-
eight States. These States include: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkino Faso, Burundi,
Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao
Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan,
Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 19 U.S.C. § 3706 (entitled
"Sub-Saharan Africa Defined").
224. It is worth noting that by its own terms, the Bill is not intended to serve as the
exclusive means through which this African rebirth will materialize. Instead, the Bill is
envisioned as merely supporting a so-called sub-Saharan renaissance already in progress. See,
e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3701(4) (observing in the political realm, for example, that "the region has
[already] experienced the strengthening of democracy as countries in sub-Saharan Africa have
taken steps to encourage broader participation in the political process"); see also John F.
Harris, Clinton Hails "African Renaissance", WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 1998, at Al.
225. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 3701(4),(7),(8),(l0).
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remains deeply divided over how best to respond to the challenges posed
by the Bill's passage. As discussed below, this uncertainty exposes a
particular inability on the part of black America to define more
concretely the parameters of a functional relationship between itself and
sub-Saharan Africa under the auspices of an informed black
internationalism.
226
This Part applies the general theoretical framework of an economi-
cally grounded black internationalism as set out above to the general
policy imperatives of the Bill, stressing that the goal here is not to de-
lineate a definitive black response to the Bill. Rather, it falls to this Part
of the Article to expose through the lens of an economically grounded
black internationalism the particular economic, legal, and institutional
considerations suggested by the Bill, and what these mean for the black
community. As a threshold matter, this Part begins by briefly tracing how
U.S. foreign policy initiatives toward sub-Saharan Africa have changed
since the end of the Cold War, and explaining how the recently enacted
AGOA embodies the core dimensions of this foreign policy realignment.
The discussion then turns to both the practical and conceptual challenges
that the AGOA poses for the American black community, and suggests
that an independent, economics-based assessment of these challenges
might lead to a more informed and coherent black response.
A. Post-Cold War Constructive Engagement:
A New U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda
for Sub-Saharan Africa
U.S. foreign policy initiatives toward sub-Saharan Africa have
undergone a profound shift since the end of the Cold War. During the
Cold War, U.S. involvement in that region consisted largely of foreign
aid assistance to select States, including direct financial and military
support of regimes that promoted U.S. foreign policy interests,
especially the containment of global Communism."' By the end of the
Cold War, America's commitment to and interest in sub-Saharan political
226. This particular problem is neither new nor novel. Almost a century earlier W.E.B.
Du Bois noted that black ignorance of African history, politics, and modem economic devel-
opments rendered effective African-American outreach toward Africa all but impossible. See
Du Bois, supra note 78, at 384-403.
227. See, e.g., Philip C. Aka, Africa in the New World Order: The Trouble with the No-
tion of African Marginalization, 9 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 187 (2001) (observing that U.S.
Cold War foreign policy initiatives toward that region were largely dictated by superpower
strategic calculations). Aka further posits that the widely accepted notion of an economically
and politically marginalized post-Cold War sub-Saharan Africa-a sub-Saharan Africa no
longer central to superpower geopolitical calculations-profoundly misstates the true status of
the region. The result Aka argues, is an inability to shape responsive and effective policies that
can address the true challenges confronting the sub-Saharan region. Id.
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and economic developments had waned, primarily because the
postcolonial superpower imperatives that shaped earlier U.S. foreign
policy thinking toward Africa were no longer of great importance.2 ' The
result was a swift and visible U.S. retreat from the sub-Saharan
geopolitical scene.
Because of a growing dissatisfaction with the scope and pace of
African reform, and given the expanding emphasis placed on economic
globalization as a development paradigm, a number of American
political elites have started to rethink U.S. foreign policy initiatives
toward Africa.29 These elites suggest that sub-Saharan Africa's salvation
lies not in unlimited foreign aid to combat the perennial problems of
draught, pestilence, starvation, and civil war, but in a new policy referred
to herein as "post-Cold War constructive re-engagement." This new
policy framework stresses the need for the states of that region to
embrace democratic systems of governance, political reform, free trade
mandates and the principles of self-reliance and self-help.230 Under
section 103(1) of the AGOA, the United States and its sub-Saharan
partners would, in striking contrast to Cold War era foreign aid
initiatives, embrace a new policy aimed at:
encouraging increased trade and investment between the
United States and sub-Saharan Africa;
negotiating reciprocal and mutually beneficial trade agree-
ments, including the possibility of establishing free trade
areas that serve the interests of both the United States and
the countries of sub-Saharan Africa; and
focusing on countries committed to the rule of law,
economic reform, and the eradication of poverty."'
228. See id. at 190 (noting that the end of the Cold War saw a reprioritization of super-
power foreign policy objectives, including the reprioritization of sub-Saharan Africa as a
region of lesser strategic importance). Aka further notes that the foreign policy vacuum that
has emerged provides donor States, non-governmental organizations, and other international
bodies the ideal chance to revitalize foreign policy initiatives toward the sub-Saharan region in
a more thoughtful and effective fashion. Id.
229. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2001 COMPREHENSIVE RE-
PORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT POLICY
TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OP-
PORTUNITY ACT 1 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 AGOA Report] (noting that "[tihe AGOA
establishes a new framework for U.S. trade, investment, and development policy for sub-
Saharan Africa").
230. See id. at 1.
231. See Trade and Development Act of 2000 (African Trade Bill), 19 U.S.C.
§ 3702(l),(4),(5) (2000).
[Vol. 23:807
Black Internationalism
This abrupt shift toward a free-trade friendly paradigm that stresses
the centrality of an underlying system of predictable legal norms is con-
sistent with the definition of economic globalization suggested in
Section L.A above. From a U.S. foreign policy perspective, the road to
sub-Saharan Africa's salvation rests upon that region's willingness to
adopt the tenets of economic globalization and political reform, and to
pursue aggressively the benefits that purportedly lie therein.232
B. The African Growth and Opportunity Act
Supporters of the AGOA, including some prominent members of the
black community, argue that its passage will bring U.S. foreign policy
initiatives toward sub-Saharan Africa firmly into the twenty-first cen-
tury.233 Under the terms of the AGOA, the United States in collaboration
with its African partners will jettison an outdated system of foreign aid
assistance that has remained disconnected to any concrete expectations
of reform, economic liberalization, and political democratization. Addi-
tionally, the Bill's supporters argue that its passage will usher in a new
era of mutual economic cooperation between the United States and the
232. This shift in U.S. foreign aid thinking, with its insistence on self-reliance, govern-
mental reform, and adoption of free trade policies, contrasts sharply with the more traditional
foreign aid and development paradigm outlined in the Lome Convention. As discussed in
Section I.B, supra, that paradigm provides trade preferences to certain product classes that
originate in the ACP States, preferences that in some cases appear to violate VTO mandates
prohibiting discriminatory treatment of imported products. Moreover, it is not coincidental
that the AGOA was first proposed during the height of the Banana wars trade dispute between
the United States and the EU, and then only after U.S. foreign policy initiatives toward Africa
encountered criticism by the WTO. The United States responded to these concerns by passing
§ 134 of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3554 (1994). One should note that
the foreign aid paradigm pursued by the EU under the Lome Convention has itself been criti-
cized for embracing an outdated foreign policy model that is no longer effective. See
Sheppard, supra note 101, at 89. It is also worth noting that not all EU Member States support
the goals of the Lome Convention. See, e.g., Case C-280/93, F.R.G. v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-
5039, 34 1L.M. 154 (1995).
The foregoing discussion reveals that no clear consensus exists among the industrialized
northern States over precisely what form foreign aid should take, or what goals such aid initia-
tives can reasonably hope to accomplish. However, in a nation such as the United States,
where foreign aid calculations often reflect individual, instead of public, economic, and politi-
cal agendas, it is paramount that blacks attempt to influence those calculations in a manner
that gives due weight and consideration to their unique global interests. In other words, even if
blacks cannot prompt a global reevaluation over the value of foreign aid, they should attempt
to impact the dynamics of U.S. foreign aid decision making in a manner consonant with black
group values and interests. See Richardson, supra note 41, at 42-44 (arguing that African-
American interests in international law problematics related to issues such as the use of force,
the United Nations, and the hostilities in the Middle East during the Gulf War, deserve special
consideration under international law).
233. See 2001 AGOA REPORT, supra note 229, at 1.
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sub-Saharan region."' The Bill therefore has come to symbolize a new
and mutually beneficial framework for increased U.S. and sub-Saharan
economic, political, and developmental cooperation.
Not surprisingly, black critics of the AGOA have emerged. Some of
these critics have suggested that the shift in U.S. foreign policy toward
sub-Saharan Africa actually is owed not to a genuine and informed do-
mestic African foreign policy framework reassessment per se, but to a
desire to address WTO concerns over perceived U.S. foreign policy in-
consistencies toward that region.235 Importantly, whether the impetus for
the Bill's creation ultimately rests with the Clinton administration, or
owes to the WTO's chidings, the fact remains that as of May 18, 2001,
the AGOA became a political and legal reality. All of which begs a big-
ger question, namely, how should the black community respond to the
passage of the AGOA?
In the short term, the black community must first face the real possi-
bility that outflows of investor capital away from U.S. urban centers and
into the economically depressed regions of sub-Saharan Africa will re-
sult in the loss of jobs in this country. There are indications that some
commentators are aware of this looming issue. One commentator has
criticized black supporters of the AGOA like members of the Congres-
sional Black Caucus by citing their unwillingness to explain to the black
community the deeper implications of the AGOA for black workers.236
Other black leaders have argued that implementation of the AGOA
would threaten black jobs and therefore undermine black economic vi-
ability in the long term. These critics also stress that multinational
corporations will emerge as the primary beneficiaries of a trade regime
no different in principle or methodology from NAFTA. However, it is
not at all clear that the economic dislocation message is actually reach-
ing black workers. More disturbing is the fact that some black political
elites appear either unable or unwilling to inform their constituents about
these concerns because of competing political loyalties.
234. See, e.g., Hunter R. Clark, African "Renaissance": and U.S. Trade Policy, 27 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMp. L. 265 (1999) (indicating that some of the impetus for U.S. enactment of the
Bill rested on domestic economic considerations).
235. See, e.g., id. at 283 (noting that some have criticized the Clinton administration's
sincerity in proposing the AGOA. They argued that the real impetus for the shift in U.S. for-
eign policy toward Africa stemmed from a congressional directive to address the VTO's
criticisms in a concrete legislative initiative).
236. See Ronald Waters, Black Interests and the "Battle in Seattle", BRC-NEWS (Dec.
19, 1999), at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/brc-news/message/775.html (noting that mem-
bers of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) who supported the AGOA could not freely
disclose the potentially adverse impacts that implementation of the Bill would have on black
workers because of their support of and allegiance to the Clinton administration).
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Unlike the members of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) 237
who appear unable to take an independent stand on the economic dislo-
cation issue because of limitations imposed by their political allegiance
to a presidential administration that embraced the underlying aims of the
AGOA, a politically independent black internationalism would suffer no
such limitations. It would remain free to pursue the interests of its own
constituents without regard to the policy preferences of the major politi-
cal parties by openly acknowledging the economic tensions that
underscore the AGOA, and by proposing strategies responsive to these
issues.
Second, passage of the AGOA raises fundamental questions about
the relationship between African-Americans and the States of sub-
Saharan Africa, and how the AGOA might impact those relations. Given
that the economic dislocations caused by job migrations to the sub-
Saharan African region might very well occur, this suggests a possible
conflict between African economic interests on the one hand, and African-
American economic interests on the other. It is not clear that a Pan-African
philosophy that stresses global solidarity in the face of such conflicts can
readily resolve these tensions. By way of contrast, an economically
grounded black internationalism would posit that such tensions are all but
unavoidable in the era of globalization. Moreover, such a philosophy
would posit that the challenge under such a scenario lies not in the
237. It would be useful to learn precisely what role the members of the CBC envision the
black community serving within the larger AGOA framework. In the more than 140-page
2001 AGOA Report delivered by the President to Congress in May of 2001, 1 found not one
reference to the role envisioned for black institutions in the much-heralded sub-Saharan eco-
nomic and political renaissance. The absence of any such discussion in the Report is equally
baffling given the relatively high profile role certain classes of Cuban-Americans are envi-
sioned to play in the analogous rebirth of Cuba that is predicted to follow the much-
anticipated fall of the Castro regime. See, e.g., Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity
(LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. § 6022 (2000) [hereinafter LIBERTAD]. For example,
LIBERTAD identifies as a core objective the need "(6) to protect United States nationals
against confiscatory takings and the wrongful trafficking in property confiscated by the Castro
regime." This provision suggests that a democratic, post-Castro Cuba would provide some
kind of property restitution to Cuban-Americans whose property had been confiscated after
Castro came to power. Thus, at least under the provisions of LIBERTAD, it is envisioned that
former Cuban-American estate holders would be able to participate in the process of Cuban
liberation not merely as interested observers advising from the mainland, but as actual owner-
participants in the island's post-Castro era of economic and political transformation. It is
worth noting that at least one commentator has concluded that the means by which
LIBERTAD seeks to promote Cuba's reintegration into the community of democratic, free-
dom-loving States may actually violate international law. See, e.g., Leslie R. Goldberg, Trade
Policy and Election-Year Politics: The Truth about Ttle III of the Helms-Burton Act, 18 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 217 (1997) (observing that Title III of LIBERTAD, which confers on former
Cuban property owners a private right of action against foreign firms that do business with and
profit from their relationships with nationalized firms, is both ineffective as foreign policy, and
arguably illegal under international law).
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absolute avoidance of such conflicts, but in the frank willingness of
Africans and African-Americans to recognize those areas wherein their
interests converge, and also to recognize those instances wherein their
interests diverge.
The ability of an economically grounded black internationalism to
accomplish this task requires that its proponents demonstrate a high de-
gree of ideological independence. This requires both the willingness and
an ability to develop critical insights born of an independent evaluation
of black interests outside of the limited conceptual orthodoxy champi-
oned by either the neoliberal or the antiglobalization camps. Black
political elites who supported passage of the AGOA appeared unable to
assess critically the deeper economic and labor implications of the Bill
because they lacked the ideological and institutional independence that
would permit them to engage openly in such an exercise. By the same
token, black critics of the AGOA appeared, and still appear, unable to
propose constructive and responsive global agendas for black interna-
tionalism beyond the limited foci of the standard antiglobalization
discourse championed by critics like Ralph Nader. 3 Critical insights like
Nader's no doubt serve a useful descriptive function, and at a basic level,
I advocate the adoption of similar critical insights on the part of black
internationalism. However, as suggested above, the global problematics
that the AGOA poses in terms of long-held assumptions about the nature
of African-American and African relations, the intragroup conflicting
paradigms suggested therein, and how to address these issues pragmati-
cally lie outside of the antiglobalizationist's conceptual field of vision.
On purely practical grounds, a failure to overcome this conceptual
impasse leaves black internationalism forever incapable of defining more
clearly the dimensions of a productive relationship between black Amer-
ica and the States of sub-Saharan Africa, either within the pro-trade-
economic empowerment paradigm championed by the AGOA or along
alternative lines.
By way of contrast, a critique informed by the imperatives of an
economics-based black internationalism would transcend these
externally imposed conceptual restraints in favor of an interpretative
paradigm more consonant with core black interests and objectives. For
238. Ironically, Ralph Nader himself criticized select members of the Congressional
Black Caucus who supported the AGOA on the ground that "they are being corporatized. Half
of the Black Caucus voted for the African Trade Bill. NAAFTA [sic] for Africa. It is a new
Colonialism." Up Close with Ralph Nader, SAN FRANCISCO BAY GUARDIAN (May 26, 2000),
http://www.sfbg.com/upclose/nader.html. This does mean that I endorse Nader's position on
NAFTA or the African Trade Bill (ATB). What matters here is that black leadership must dis-
cuss the issues Nader raises and decide for themselves, based on internal black criterion, what
is good and bad about the ATB specifically, and the global economy more generally.
[Vol. 23:807
Black Internationalism
example, such a critique might propose a constructive agenda that black
institutions might pursue to minimize the adverse labor impact that
implementation of the AGOA would purportedly generate. Such a
critique also might indicate that the correct response would be for blacks
to actually participate as entrepreneurs in the free trade regime promoted
under the auspices of the AGOA. In the end, the precise strategic agenda
that an economics-based black internationalism might identify and
pursue is irrelevant. What remains both relevant and paramount is that an
economics-based black internationalism must adopt a critical ideological
perspective liberated from the conceptual limitations imposed by an
uncritical conformity to the prevailing proglobalization discourse.
Similarly, it must strive to liberate black internationalism from the
externally prescribed and often dogmatic constraints of the prevailing
antiglobalization orthodoxy that thus far has proven unable to respond
effectively to the realities of black economic and political life in
postindustrial America, and beyond.
CONCLUSION
This Article has advocated the adoption of an economically
grounded black internationalism as one way to overcome the conceptual
and institutional limitations that have historically impeded black pro-
gress in the global arena. This impasse has frequently been reinforced by
black internationalism's adoption of interpretative paradigms not always
responsive to the needs and aspirations of the black community. It is my
belief that an economics-based paradigm, one premised on an independ-
ent evaluation of concrete black needs in the emerging economic world
order, might overcome these limitations.
Second, an implicit aim of an economics-based black internationalism
must be to help heal the economic, political, and social rift that has created
not just two Americas, but two black Americas: the black middle class and
an increasingly disenfranchised poor black America, a group one scholar
has termed "the truly disadvantaged."23 9 In this sense, the ideological
animus between Du Bois and Garvey remains in place; it has simply
become more insidious, more difficult to root out. The tensions have, in
a sense, become structural, institutional . 4 So long as this tension exists,
black America will never achieve the vision of economic self-sufficiency
pursued so diligently by Garvey and his followers almost a century ago.
However, we should not view a realigned black internationalism as a
239. See WILSON, supra note 24.
240. See generally LEIMAN, supra note 16.
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panacea able to fix all of the problems and social pathologies that afflict
the black community in twenty-first century America. No single
institution or movement, no matter how far-reaching and profound, has
the capacity to engender such a shift. All that one can reasonably hope
for is progress in small, incremental steps.
More generally, the aim of this Article is to engender continued de-
bate over the ultimate feasibility of an economics-based black
internationalism in an era of economic globalization and ever-increasing
geopolitical uncertainty. Thus, the purpose of the Article is to provide an
alternative black empowerment paradigm, one that ideally would en-
hance existing theoretical paradigms. My hope is that critical race
scholars might adopt or at least consider critically this interpretative
model as they continue to define the parameters of a comprehensive the-
ory of international racial justice for the black community in
postindustrial American society.
